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I. Introduction 
When United States citizens initiate legal action against a 
foreign entity, they face a significant jurisdictional obstacle—the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).1 The FSIA provides a 
general grant of immunity to foreign states and their 
instrumentalities from United States court jurisdiction;2 however, 
it establishes a number of exceptions where a foreign sovereign’s 
acts are subject to adjudication in the United States.3 Prior to the 
FSIA, the United States exercised absolute sovereign immunity, 
leaving any citizen injured by foreign state action with no remedy.4 
But increased international commerce during the twentieth 
century led to the application of a more restrictive interpretation 
of immunity and the adoption of the FSIA’s commercial activities 
exception.5 The commercial activities exception contains three 
clauses, each providing grounds for lifting a foreign state’s 
immunity when a state’s commercial act impacts the United 
States.6 This Note examines the third clause of the commercial 
activities exception—the “direct effect” clause. The direct effect 
clause provides an exception to the grant of immunity for “an act 
outside the territory of the United States in connection with a 
                                                                                                     
 1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611 (2012). 
 2. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (“Subject to existing international agreements to 
which the United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign 
state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and 
of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.”). 
 3. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605–1607 (outlining exceptions in addition to the 
commercial activities exception, including waiver, state-sponsored terrorism, and 
noncommercial tortious activity).  
 4. See infra Part III.A (discussing the international law principles behind 
the theory of absolute sovereign immunity). 
 5. See infra Part III.B (discussing the political motivations for codifying the 
application of restrictive sovereign immunity).  
 6. See infra notes 183–187 (detailing the three clauses of the commercial 
activities exception and the jurisdictional requirements for each clause).  
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commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act 
causes a direct effect in the United States.”7 
Interpreting the direct effect clause has created confusion 
among the courts—particularly when determining the clause’s 
personal jurisdiction requirements.8 Initial interpretations of the 
direct effect clause divided courts on what constituted a “direct 
effect” in the United States. The first theory required that an 
activity caused an effect that was “substantial and foreseeable,” 
while the second theory evaluated if the effect was “sufficiently 
direct” that Congress would have wanted a United States court to 
hear the case.9 In its attempt to provide clarity on the clause’s 
scope, the Supreme Court held in Republic of Argentina v. 
Weltover,10 that “an effect is ‘direct’ if it follows as an immediate 
consequence of the defendant’s activity.”11  
While the Weltover holding established criteria for acts 
constituting a “direct effect,” the opinion remained silent on the 
clause’s personal jurisdiction implications.12 In Weltover, both 
parties raised the issue of applying a minimum contacts analysis, 
established by the Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,13 
which requires that an entity have sufficient minimum contacts 
with the forum state before that state’s court can assert personal 
jurisdiction.14 Ultimately, the Court did not determine if the direct 
effect clause required a minimum contacts analysis; rather, it 
declined to address the issue and left the question open.15 
                                                                                                     
 7. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). 
 8. See infra Part IV (outlining various courts’ interpretations of the 
meaning of direct effect and the clause’s personal jurisdiction requirements). 
 9. See infra Part IV.A (detailing the circuit split resulting from courts’ 
initial interpretations of the direct effect clause).  
 10. 504 U.S. 607 (1992).  
 11. Id. at 618. 
 12. See infra Part IV.A (discussing that some circuits adopted additional 
requirements of substantiality and foreseeability). 
 13. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 14. See id. at 316 (stating that due process required minimum contacts “such 
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice’” (citations omitted)). 
 15. See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 619 (“Assuming, without deciding, that a 
foreign state is a ‘person’ for purposes of the Due Process Clause, we find that 
Argentina possessed ‘minimum contacts’ that would satisfy the constitutional 
test.”). 
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Following Weltover, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits split in their 
interpretations of the direct effect clause’s personal jurisdiction 
requirement. In 2001, the Ninth Circuit in Corzo v. Banco Central 
de Reserva del Peru16 analyzed the personal jurisdiction element 
by extending due process protection to a Peruvian government 
bank.17 The court determined that asserting personal jurisdiction 
required a nexus between the activity of the foreign state and the 
cause of action—that connection required satisfying the minimum 
contacts test.18 In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit 
emphasized the structure, purpose, and legislative history of the 
FSIA.19 Contrarily, in 2016, the Sixth Circuit concluded in Rote v. 
Zel Custom Manufacturing LLC20 that a foreign state did not need 
minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction under the direct effect 
clause.21 The court found that the phrase “causes a direct effect in 
the United States” unambiguous,22 and because it could resolve the 
issue by applying the plain language of the statute, examining the 
FSIA’s legislative history was unnecessary.23 
The question explored in this Note is whether, under the direct 
effect clause of the FSIA commercial activities exception, a foreign 
sovereign must have minimum contacts with the United States in 
order for a U.S. court to assert personal jurisdiction over the entity. 
Examining personal jurisdiction over foreign states under the 
direct effect clause requires exploring the interaction between 
constitutional law and principles of international law. The 
                                                                                                     
 16. 243 F.3d 519 (9th Cir. 2001).  
 17. See id. at 525–26 (concluding that personal jurisdiction under the direct 
effect clause incorporates a minimum contacts analysis). 
 18. See id. at 526 (determining that a foreign state had insufficient contacts 
with the United States, so jurisdiction was improper and any incidental effects 
were irrelevant).  
 19. See id. at 523 (noting that the ”waiver exception to sovereign immunity 
must be narrowly construed”).  
 20. 816 F.3d 383 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 21. See id. at 394 (stating that following a minimum contacts analysis adds 
an unnecessary requirement to the statute).   
 22. See id. at 395 (arguing that the Ninth Circuit went beyond the plain 
meaning of the FSIA’s terms by reading in additional statutory requirements).  
 23. See id. at 392–93 (stating that even if the court looked at the legislative 
history, the minimum contacts argument was still unpersuasive as it merely 
added “‘unexpressed requirement[s],’ rather than resolve any inherent 
ambiguity” (citing Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992).  
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minimum contacts analysis highlights the tension between 
applying constitutional due process protection to a foreign state, 
while simultaneously asserting jurisdiction over its commercial 
activities. Denying jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign under the 
Due Process Clause may defeat the intent of the FSIA’s immunity 
exceptions created to provide relief for U.S. plaintiffs injured by 
foreign states. Deciding questions of personal jurisdiction over 
foreign entities requires identifying the goals of foreign sovereign 
immunity, why the FSIA established exceptions to that immunity, 
and what constitutional protections the United States should 
provide to foreign states. 
This Note proceeds as follows: Part II of this Note examines 
personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause and how courts 
have applied due process protections to nontraditional entities.24 
Part III discusses the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity, 
concerns that led Congress to pass the FSIA, and the purpose of 
the commercial activities exception.25 Part IV explains the current 
circuit split involving the minimum contacts requirement 
following the guidance from the Supreme Court in Weltover.26 
Part V concludes by arguing that recognizing foreign sovereigns as 
“persons” under the Due Process Clause is improper, and that 
reading a minimum contacts test into the direct effect clause is 
contrary to the structure and intent of the FSIA commercial 
activities exception.27   
II. Applying Due Process Protections to Foreign States 
The minimum contacts test established in International Shoe 
Co. v. Washington28 provides protection against unconstitutional 
                                                                                                     
 24. See infra Part II (detailing how courts have applied due process 
protection to foreign corporations, aliens, and domestic states). 
 25. See infra Part III (discussing the restrictive theory of sovereign 
immunity and its impact of the development of the commercial activities 
exception). 
 26. See infra Part IV (detailing the current circuit split over whether a 
minimum contacts test is required to assert personal jurisdiction under the direct 
effect clause). 
 27. See infra Part V (arguing that the statutory provisions in the FSIA 
provide the appropriate personal jurisdiction criteria). 
 28. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
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exercises of personal jurisdiction. Deciding if a minimum contacts 
analysis is relevant to a foreign state requires examining what 
protections a foreign state receives under the Due Process Clause. 
The critical determination is whether a foreign state is a “person” 
for purposes of due process. This Part examines personal 
jurisdiction applied to nontraditional “persons” and what 
constitutional protections, if any, should apply to foreign states.  
A. Personal Jurisdiction and the Minimum Contacts Test 
Established in International Shoe 
Before discussing the application of a minimum contacts test 
to a foreign entity, it is helpful to examine the origin of the personal 
jurisdiction doctrine. Personal jurisdiction developed under a 
theory of territorialism—that a state’s borders defined the limits 
of its jurisdiction.29 Strict territorialism proved difficult to apply as 
modern commerce evolved to include cross-border transactions, 
leading the Supreme Court to adopt a more flexible standard to 
accommodate increasing interstate commerce.30  
1. The Territorial Approach to Jurisdiction Prior to International 
Shoe 
Prior to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, personal jurisdiction in the United States was settled 
under common law, which was rooted in international law 
principles.31 Common law rested on a theory of territorial 
                                                                                                     
 29. See Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal 
Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Alien Defendants, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 8–9 
(2006) (describing that jurisdiction was based on the theory that each sovereign 
had jurisdiction to bind persons and things within its physical borders). 
 30. See Danielle Keats Citron, Minimum Contacts in a Borderless World: 
Voice Over Internet Protocol and the Coming Implosion of Personal Jurisdiction 
Theory, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1481, 1506–07 (2006) (discussing that the modern 
changes in transportation and communication prompted the Supreme Court to 
expand jurisdiction).  
 31. See Roger H. Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal 
Jurisdiction, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 849, 872 (1989) (discussing that applying 
common law principles was appealing to courts because its straightforward 
application yielded consistent results).  
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jurisdiction—that each sovereign had jurisdiction over the people 
and property within its physical borders.32 The only constitutional 
provision relevant to jurisdiction was the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause requiring one state to recognize another state’s final 
judgment.33 But the Clause did not carry significant weight 
against the common law territorial personal jurisdiction restraint. 
The Supreme Court determined in D’Arcy v. Ketchum34 that the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause did not modify the common law 
limitations on enforcing another state’s judgement.35 Following 
D’Arcy, the Clause was understood as an exception to the common 
law, not a provision which defeated the international principles of 
territorialism.36  
In 1877, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Pennoyer v. Neff37 
reinforced the idea of territorial jurisdiction.38 Pennoyer concerned 
the validity of a default judgment entered by an Oregon state court 
where it asserted personal jurisdiction over the defendant, even 
though he was neither a resident nor a domicile of that state.39 The 
Court recognized that following the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, a party could challenge this type of judgment on the 
ground that it violated due process for a court to determine rights 
and obligations of parties not subject to its jurisdiction.40 The 
                                                                                                     
 32. See Parrish, supra note 29, at 8 (noting that under international law, 
territorial jurisdiction came about as an important limit on independent 
sovereigns’ actions towards each other).  
 33. See id. at 8–9 (arguing that constitutional law had no bearing on 
jurisdiction). 
 34. 52 U.S. 165 (1850). 
 35. See id. at 174 (determining that personal jurisdiction was proper when 
it conformed with well-established rules of international law). 
 36. See John N. Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal Jurisdiction, 68 
IOWA L. REV 1015, 1025 (1983) (arguing that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did 
not displace international law as the original source of jurisdictional rules).   
 37. 95 U.S. 714 (1877), overruled in part by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 
(1977). 
 38. See Parrish, supra note 29, at 11 (“As a result [of Pennoyer], presence 
within a forum state’s territorial borders became the sine qua non standard for 
personal jurisdiction.”). 
 39. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 719 (outlining the Oregon statute that allowed 
for personal service on an individual’s property). 
 40. See id. at 734 (“[D]ue process of law would require appearance or 
personal service before the defendant could be personally bound by any judgment 
rendered.”). 
130 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 123 (2019) 
Court determined that the Oregon state judgment was void—a 
plaintiff could only serve a nonresident defendant when the 
defendant was within the state’s boundaries.41  
While the Pennoyer decision reinforced the principles of 
territorial sovereignty found in international law, the Court 
accomplished this by grounding its decision in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, thereby associating territoriality with constitutional 
doctrine.42 “Pennoyer v. Neff thus established the principle that a 
judgment is entitled to full faith and credit only if it satisfies the 
requirements of the Due Process Clause, for if it does not meet 
those requirements it is not properly enforceable even within the 
State which rendered it.”43 
 
2. International Shoe and the Minimum Contacts Requirement 
The rise of corporations and an increase in interstate 
transactions made it difficult for courts in applying the rigid 
territorial principles set forth in Pennoyer.44 Because corporations 
existed as separate “fictional” legal entities, courts initially 
recognized that the corporation was subject to personal jurisdiction 
only in its state of incorporation.45 However, as corporations 
increasingly conducted business across state lines, multiple states 
developed an interest in asserting personal jurisdiction over their 
commercial activity.46 As a result of the rise of interstate 
commerce, the Supreme Court adopted a less territorial approach 
in International Shoe Co. v. Washington47—a state may assert 
                                                                                                     
 41. See id. at 733 (distinguishing the requirement for proceedings impacting 
personal rights from in rem proceedings where the nature of the proceeding 
impacts a nonresidents property within the forum state).  
 42. See Parrish, supra note 29, at 10 (discussing that territorialism shaped 
the Court’s interpretation of jurisdiction).  
 43. Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause, and the 
In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 573 (1958).  
 44. See Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts, 79 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 101, 107 (2010) (stating that narrow territorial jurisdiction rules 
were “too inflexible to govern the modern reality of interstate corporate 
business”). 
 45. See id. (discussing the initial limitations on personal jurisdiction over 
corporations). 
 46. See id. (noting that states other than the state of incorporation sought to 
adjudicate claims arising from corporations’ activities). 
 47. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).  
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personal jurisdiction over a corporation, but only if the entity 
maintains sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state.48  
In International Shoe, the Court had to determine if a 
Delaware corporation was subject to Washington state court 
jurisdiction because of its activities in Washington, and if so, if that 
jurisdiction was consistent with the Due Process Clause.49 The 
defendant was incorporated in Delaware and had its principal 
place of business in Missouri.50 While it maintained places of 
business in other states, it did not have an office in Washington 
and made no contracts for sale or purchase of merchandise in the 
state.51 During a period of three years, the corporation employed 
thirteen salespeople who resided in Washington.52 These 
employees generated $31,000 each year in commission based on 
activities solely within Washington.53 These employees had 
authority to solicit orders from prospective buyers at prices fixed 
by the corporation, but they had no authority to enter into 
contracts or make collections on the corporation’s behalf.54 The 
Washington-based salespeople transmitted orders to the 
corporation’s principal place of business in Missouri, and all 
merchandise was shipped from outside of Washington to the 
purchaser within the state.55  
The commissioner of the state unemployment compensation 
fund issued an order and notice of assessment of delinquent 
contributions under a statute requiring employers to contribute to 
                                                                                                     
 48. See id. at 316 (stating that a corporation’s presence can only manifest 
through the acts of its authorized agents).  
 49. See id. at 311 (outlining the claim concerning unpaid contributions to 
Washington’s unemployment compensation fund).  
 50. See id. at 313 (detailing the corporation’s footwear manufacturing and 
sales operation). 
 51. See id. (stating that the corporation maintained places of business 
outside of Washington for manufacturing and distribution). 
 52. See id. (noting that these salespeople were the corporation’s only agents 
in Washington).  
 53. See id. (discussing that while the salespeople lived in Washington, they 
reported to supervisors in Missouri).  
 54. See id. (stating that the employees had limited authority to act for the 
corporation).  
 55. See id. (discussing how the corporation filled orders from Washington 
customers). 
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the state’s fund.56 The statute authorized the commissioner to 
serve notice on an employer through personal service if the 
employer was in the state, or alternatively to mail it to the last 
known address.57 The commissioner served notice on one of the 
sales agents located in Washington, and also mailed a copy to the 
corporation’s headquarters in Missouri.58 International Shoe 
moved to set aside the order and notice of assessment, claiming 
that it neither had authorized agents in Washington, nor 
conducted business in the state.59 According to the corporation, it 
did not maintain sufficient activities in Washington, so subjecting 
it to the state court’s jurisdiction violated due process.60 
Applying the minimum contacts standard, the Court 
determined that the activities on behalf of the corporation in 
Washington were “neither irregular nor casual.”61 The corporation 
maintained continuous activities in Washington which provided it 
with great financial benefit.62 Accordingly, because the corporation 
received the benefit of state law protections over its activities, it 
must answer to the state’s courts when it adjudicates a matter 
arising from those acts.63 The corporation had “sufficient contacts 
or ties with the state of the forum to make it reasonable and just 
according to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial 
justice to permit the state to enforce the obligations which 
appellant has incurred there.”64  
                                                                                                     
 56. See id. at 311 (noting that the state of Washington administered this 
unemployment fund).  
 57. See id. at 312 (describing the statutory requirements for service on an 
employer to notify it of the commissioner’s assessment of delinquent 
contributions).  
 58. See id. (noting that either method alone satisfied proper service). 
 59. See id. (stating that International Shoe argued that it did not meet the 
statutory definition of an employer).  
 60. See id. at 315 (noting that International Shoe further argued that 
because it was not present in the state, Washington’s fine assessment violated 
due process). 
 61. See id. at 320 (describing the corporation’s presence in Washington as 
systematic and continuous).  
 62. See id. (noting that the corporation obtained significant interstate 
business from its operations in Washington).  
 63. See id. (discussing that the state court had jurisdiction because the claim 
arose from continuous activities in Washington).   
 64. Id. 
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The Court recognized that the territorial principles set forth 
in Pennoyer led to an outdated analysis when applied to modern, 
interstate corporations.65 Chief Justice Stone set out the new 
minimum contacts standard, stating that:  
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant 
to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the 
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with 
it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”66 
The minimum contacts standard stemmed from careful 
consideration of unique corporate factors rendering a territorial 
analysis of personal jurisdiction imprecise. First, although a 
corporation “exists” only as a legal fiction, its “presence” can only 
be determined by the actions of its authorized agents.67 Second, 
“presence” in a state is satisfied where a corporation operates 
continuously, but casual or isolated activities do not support a 
finding of general jurisdiction.68 Finally, even if a corporation has 
insufficient acts in the state to establish general jurisdiction, 
certain acts by their nature subject the corporation to the 
jurisdiction of the forum state.69 
These considerations led to the Court’s conclusion that using 
states’ physical boundaries to scrutinize a corporation’s due 
process protections for purposes of personal jurisdiction produced 
an inaccurate analysis.70 Rather, a due process analysis turned on 
                                                                                                     
 65. See id. at 316 (“Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment 
in personam is grounded on their de facto power over the defendant's person. 
Hence his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of court was prerequisite to 
its rendition of a judgment personally binding him.” (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 
U.S. 714, 733 (1877))). 
 66. Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).  
 67. See id. (“[T]he terms ‘present’ or ‘presence’ are used merely to symbolize 
those activities of the corporation’s agent within the state which courts will deem 
to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process.”). 
 68. See id. at 317 (“[I]t has been generally recognized that the casual 
presence of the corporate agent or even his conduct of single or isolated items of 
activities in a state [on] the corporation’s behalf are not enough to subject it to 
suit on causes of action unconnected with the activities there.”). 
 69. See id. at 318 (“[D]ecisions holding the corporation amenable to suit have 
been supported by resort to the legal fiction that it has given its consent to service 
and suit, consent being implied from its presence in the state through the acts of 
its authorized agents.”). 
 70. See id. at 319 (“It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the 
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“the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and 
orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the 
due process clause to insure.”71 Following International Shoe, an 
inquiry into personal jurisdiction focused on the relationship 
between the forum state, the defendant, and the nature of the 
underlying claim; sovereign territorial authority, while not 
irrelevant, took a subordinate role in the analysis.72  
B. Foreign States’ Right to Due Process 
Before a court may hear a case, it must have both subject 
matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the parties.73 
While subject matter jurisdiction is typically determined by 
statute or the nature of the claim,74 personal jurisdiction involves 
considerations of fairness towards the defendant.75 In a claim 
involving a foreign entity, a finding of minimum contacts satisfies 
the due process requirements for specific jurisdiction.76 When the 
                                                                                                     
boundary line between those activities which justify the subjection of a 
corporation to suit, and those which do not, cannot be simply mechanical or 
quantitative.”). 
 71. Id.  
 72. See Parrish, supra note 29, at 13 (describing that International Shoe 
signaled a dramatic shift in jurisdiction theory).  
 73. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) (requiring dismissal for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2) (requiring dismissal for lack of personal 
jurisdiction). 
 74. See Pauline Whittinghill Klyce Pennoyer, A New Frontera: Foreign 
Sovereign Immunity, Arbitral Awards and a Waive Goodbye to Assets, 49 COLUM. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 115, 120 (describing subject matter jurisdiction as more clearly 
determinable). 
 75. See id. at 121 (“While the [personal jurisdiction] doctrine has evolved 
over several centuries, basic concerns of fundamental fairness toward the 
defendant remain at its center.”). 
 76. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 
(1984) 
Even when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the 
foreign corporation’s activities in the forum State, due process is not 
offended by a State’s subjecting the corporation to its in personam 
jurisdiction when there are sufficient contacts between the State and 
the foreign corporation. 
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defendant is a private party, a finding of either general or specific 
jurisdiction suffices.77 
When Congress drafted the FSIA, it imposed specific 
exceptions to a foreign state’s general immunity. Federal district 
courts have original subject matter jurisdiction over these civil 
claims when an FSIA exception applies.78 The court is only 
required to determine that the foreign state’s action giving rise to 
the claim qualifies under one of the express statutory exceptions.79 
Additionally, courts have personal jurisdiction over a state so long 
as service is made consistent with the requirements set out in the 
Act.80 Beyond these statutory grants of jurisdiction, courts have 
come to varying conclusions about whether the FSIA imposes 
additional requirements.81  
Determining whether a foreign state is entitled to 
constitutional protections under the Due Process Clause is 
essential to determining if the direct effect clause of the 
commercial activities exception requires minimum contacts for 
personal jurisdiction.82 The Supreme Court avoided addressing 
this issue in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.83 In Weltover, 
the Court did not address the question of minimum contacts 
because it found the issue irrelevant provided that the foreign 
                                                                                                     
 77. See id. (discussing jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant).  
 78. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (2012) (“The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction . . . against a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title as 
to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not 
entitled to immunity either under sections 1605–1607 . . . .”). 
 79. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2012) (providing the statutory grounds for 
subject matter jurisdiction).  
 80. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (2012) (“Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state 
shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts have 
jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been made under section 1608 
of this title.”). 
 81. See Frontera Res. Azer. Corp. v. State Oil Co. of the Azer. Republic, 582 
F.3d 393, 400 (2d Cir. 2009) (determining that foreign instrumentalities are not 
afforded Due Process Clause protections); Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (recognizing that safeguards under 
the Due Process Clause are inapplicable to foreign states); Tex. Trading & Milling 
Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 313 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 
454 U.S. 1148 (1982) (finding that a constitutional due process analysis supports 
personal jurisdiction over a foreign state). 
 82. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (describing the minimum 
contacts test). 
 83. 504 U.S. 607 (1992). 
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sovereign had clearly established minimum contacts with the 
United States, making the inquiry unnecessary.84 Deciding 
whether the FSIA requires minimum contacts for jurisdiction has 
led to ambiguity and inconsistent application.85 In several 
decisions following Weltover, courts have held that the 
minimum contacts test is inapplicable as foreign states are not 
entitled to constitutional protection.86  
An entity must qualify as a “person” before it receives 
protection under the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court has 
interpreted “person” more broadly to include entities other than 
human beings.87 While the Supreme Court has never clearly 
addressed a foreign state’s right to due process, courts have ruled 
on related issues: foreign corporations, aliens, and domestic states. 
 First, courts have regularly recognized that a foreign private 
corporation is a “person” for purposes of due process.88 The 
Supreme Court applied this corporate personhood analysis in 
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,89 determining 
that the foreign corporation’s contacts with the state of Texas were 
insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.90 The Colombian 
                                                                                                     
 84. See id. at 619 (“Assuming, without deciding, that a foreign state is a 
‘person’ for purposes of the Due Process Clause . . . we find that Argentina 
possessed ‘minimum contacts’ that would satisfy the constitutional test.”). 
 85. See infra Part IV (detailing the current circuit split on incorporating a 
minimum contacts test). 
 86. See Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661, 694 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(“[T]he ‘commercial activity’ inquiry under the FSIA is not congruent with a 
general personal jurisdiction inquiry . . . .”); Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 266 
Fed. App’x. 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (determining that foreign states are not protected 
by the Fifth Amendment); Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 879 F. Supp. 2d 44, 
57 (D.D.C. 2012) (“Foreign sovereigns cannot use the constitutional constraints of 
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause to shield themselves from large 
punitive damages awards under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act terrorism 
exception . . . .”). 
 87. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 111 (1987) 
(evaluating a foreign corporation’s right to due process). 
 88. See Karen Halverson, Is a Foreign State a “Person”? Does it Matter?: 
Personal Jurisdiction, Due Process, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 34 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 115, 136 (2001) (stating that while it is clear that a 
foreign corporation is a person for due process purposes, “the rationale for this 
proposition has gone unexplained”).  
 89. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).  
 90. See id. at 418 (determining that the brief presence of the corporation’s 
employees in Texas were insignificant).  
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corporation, Helicol, crashed a helicopter while working on a 
Peruvian pipeline, killing four U.S. citizens in the accident.91 The 
decedents were employed by a Peruvian company, Consorcio, that 
contracted with Helicol for work on the pipeline.92 The contract 
negotiation between Consorcio and Helicol took place in Texas.93 
Helicol’s contact with Texas outside of the negotiation included 
purchasing helicopters from a Texas company and sending its 
employees to the state for training.94 The Court determined that 
Helicol’s contact with Texas was insufficient to establish personal 
jurisdiction over the corporation for wrongful death actions 
brought in Texas. Helicol’s employee’s trips to Texas were not 
“continuous and systematic” and could therefore not establish 
minimum contacts justifying Texas’s assertion of personal 
jurisdiction.95  
Shortly after Helicopteros, the Court decided Asahi Metal 
Industry Co. v. Superior Court,96 where it added the “substantial 
connection” requirement to the minimum contacts analysis for a 
foreign corporation.97 In Asahi, the Court held that minimum 
contacts with a forum required more than the foreseeability that a 
corporation’s product would enter the forum.98 To establish 
personal jurisdiction under a minimum contacts analysis, there 
must be a substantial connection between a defendant and the 
forum state—this connection only arises from purposeful action 
                                                                                                     
 91. See id. at 410 (stating that the flight was part of Helicol’s routine 
business of providing helicopter transportation for oil and construction companies 
in South America).  
 92. See id. (discussing that Consorcio needed Helico helicopters to move 
personnel and equipment in and out of the construction area). 
 93. See id. (noting the Helio’s CEO flew to Houston for the negotiations). 
 94. See id. at 411 (stating that Helio purchased helicopters and equipment 
from Bell Helicopter Company in Fort Worth and sent employees to the Bell plant 
for training).  
 95. See id. at 416 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)) 
(noting that one trip by the CEO for negotiations was not sufficient contact). 
 96. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).  
 97. See id. at 112 (determining that the Due Process Clause requires more 
than the corporation’s mere awareness that its product enters the forum state 
through the stream of commerce).  
 98. See id. (“The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, 
without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the 
forum State.”). 
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directed toward the forum.99 Supreme Court decisions continue to 
reaffirm that a foreign corporation is a “person” under the Due 
Process Clause and that courts must make a finding of minimum 
contacts to assert personal jurisdiction.100  
Second, the Court has interpreted constitutional provisions as 
applied to aliens. Aliens may be afforded some constitutional 
protections, but generally have not received the same level of 
protection as U.S. citizens.101 The Supreme Court has extended 
protection to resident aliens under the Equal Protection Clause in 
the context of discriminatory state welfare laws,102 and under the 
Due Process Clause concerning employment opportunities under 
federal hiring regulations.103 Additionally, the Court recognized 
certain constitutional protections for illegal aliens during 
post-removal proceedings.104 These decisions have extended 
protection where the conduct occurs within the United States, but 
the Supreme Court has refused to extend due process protections 
extraterritorially when aliens suffer constitutional rights 
violations outside of the United States.105 In part, this reasoning 
stemmed from the idea that extraterritorial matters should be 
governed by principles of international law.106 The dissimilar 
                                                                                                     
 99. See id. at 113 (determining that asserting personal jurisdiction over a 
foreign corporation without this substantial connection violates traditional 
notions of fair play).   
 100. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 749 (2014) (deciding that for 
a U.S. court to have general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation, due process 
requires that the corporation is essentially “at home” in the forum state (quoting 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011))). 
 101. See Halverson, supra note 88, at 136 (noting that while aliens have some 
due process protections, they are much “narrower” than protections for citizens).  
 102. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (holding “that a 
state statute that denies welfare benefits to resident aliens . . . violate[s] the 
Equal Protection Clause”). 
 103. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 116–17 (1976) 
(determining that the Civil Service Commission Regulations deprived resident 
aliens of employment opportunities).  
 104. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688 (2001), superseded by 
regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 241.14 (determining that illegal aliens may raise 
constitutional challenges during post-removal detention proceedings). 
 105. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) 
(determining that an alien had no Fourth Amendment protection against a 
warrantless search in Mexico because the alien had not developed substantial 
connections with the United States). 
 106. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) 
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constitutional treatment of foreign corporations and aliens leads to 
conflicting interpretations of what entities constitute a “person” for 
due process protections.107  
Finally, courts have determined that domestic states are not 
“persons” for purposes of due process.108 The Supreme Court 
initially examined this issue in South Carolina v. Katzenbach,109 
when South Carolina sought an injunction against the 
enforcement of a federal statute, claiming it denied the state’s 
right to due process.110 The Court determined that the definition of 
“person” could not be construed to include states.111 Although 
Weltover did not require the Court to determine a foreign state’s 
right to due process, the Court cites to Katzenbach in the Due 
Process Clause section of the Weltover opinion.112 Since then, 
courts have interpreted this as an indication that the Court did not 
intend to extend due process protection to foreign states if it would 
not extend the same protection to domestic states.113 Prior to 
Weltover, the Second Circuit’s decision in Texas Trading & Milling 
                                                                                                     
(“[O]perations of the nation in such [foreign] territory must be governed by 
treaties, international understandings and compacts, and the principles of 
international law.”). 
 107. See Halverson, supra note 88, at 137 (arguing that the conflict may be 
reconciled by treating personal jurisdiction as a limit on U.S. sovereignty, 
separate from other rights the constitution provides).  
 108. See Frontera Res. Azer. Corp. v. State Oil Co. of the Azer. Republic, 582 
F.3d 393, 399 (2d Cir. 2009) (refusing to treat foreign states and their 
instrumentalities as persons under the Due Process Clause); TMR Energy Ltd. v. 
State Prop. Fund of Ukr., 411 F.3d 296, 302 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that a 
foreign state and its agents are not persons for due process purposes); Price v. 
Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(rejecting the notion that a foreign state is a person under the Fifth Amendment). 
 109. 383 U.S. 301. 
 110. See id. at 323 (describing South Carolina’s request for an injunction 
against enforcement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965).  
 111. See id. (“The word ‘person’ in the context of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment cannot, by any reasonable mode of interpretation, be 
expanded to encompass the States of the Union. . . .”). 
 112. See Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992) (declining 
to determine if a foreign state is a “person” under due process while recognizing 
that precedent refused to acknowledge domestic states as “persons”). 
 113. See Frontera Res. Azer. Corp. v. State Oil Co. of Azer. Republic, 582 F.3d 
393, 398–99 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Weltover did not require deciding the issue because 
Argentina’s contacts satisfied the due process requirements . . . but the Court’s 
implication was plain: If the ‘States of the Union’ have no rights under the Due 
Process Clause, why should foreign states?”). 
140 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 123 (2019) 
Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria114 determined that a foreign 
state was entitled to due process.115 The court, resolving a question 
of immunity under the commercial activities exception, required 
that the foreign state receive due process scrutiny before the 
federal court could assert personal jurisdiction.116 The Texas 
Trading decision pre-dated the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Weltover, and in 2009 the Second Circuit decided Frontera 
Resources Azerbaijan Corporation v. State Oil Company of 
Azerbaijan Republic,117 taking a different approach to applying 
due process to foreign states.118 In Frontera, the court again 
confronted the issue of a foreign state’s right to due process under 
the FSIA.119 The court overruled its holding in Texas Trading in 
light of the Weltover decision.120 The court noted: “[A]bsent some 
compelling reason to treat foreign sovereigns more favorably than 
‘States of the Union,’ it would make no sense to view foreign states 
as ‘persons’ under the Due Process Clause.”121 
Determining the status of a foreign state raises difficult 
considerations of a foreign state’s connection with the 
Constitution.122 While the Supreme Court has not spoken 
extensively on this issue, some scholarship suggests that foreign 
                                                                                                     
 114. 647 F.2d 300 (2d. Cir. 1981), overruled by Frontera Res. Azer. Corp. v. 
State Oil Co. of Azer. Republic, 582 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 115. See id. at 308 (“[E]ach finding of personal jurisdiction under the FSIA 
requires . . . a due process scrutiny of the court’s power to exercise its authority 
over a particular defendant.”). 
 116. See id. (“[T]he [FSIA] cannot create personal jurisdiction where the 
Constitution forbids it.”). 
 117. 582 F.3d 393 (2d. Cir. 2009). 
 118. See id. at 400 (determining that a foreign state is not a “person” under 
the Due Process Clause).  
 119. See id. at 396 (noting that the foreign instrumentality did not dispute 
statutory jurisdiction under Section 1608 of the FSIA, rather that the district 
court failed to properly establish minimum contacts required for personal 
jurisdiction under due process).  
 120. See id. at 398 (arguing that Weltover stood for the principle that domestic 
states are not entitled to due process, therefore foreign states should not receive 
due process protection either).  
 121. Id. at 399 (quoting Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
294 F.3d 82, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). 
 122. See Halverson, supra note 88, at 137 (noting difficult constitutional 
considerations as well as foreign policy implications).  
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states have no constitutional rights.123 A number of issues arise 
when a foreign state is seen as a “person” under the Constitution—
primarily that a foreign state has no constitutional relationship to 
the federal structure.124 “When, on the other hand, a claim does not 
directly confront or conflict with the political branches’ foreign 
policy, the federal courts should adjudicate the merits of foreign 
state claims by applying constitutional jurisprudence to sustain or 
reject the claim.”125 The Constitution does not explicitly detail how 
courts should treat foreign states with respect to the privileges 
that the Constitution grants to United States citizens, but it does 
anticipate the presence of foreign sovereigns and their involvement 
in federal judicial proceedings.126 Although foreign states are 
significantly more engaged in commerce than earlier in history, the 
Constitution does not provide that foreign states are to receive the 
same treatment as domestic parties.127   
III. The FSIA Commercial Activities Exception: A Legislative 
History 
The current circuit split between the Ninth and Sixth Circuits 
highlights the role that the legislative history plays in courts’ 
interpretation of the direct effect clause. The issue of personal 
jurisdiction under the FSIA becomes clearer in the full context of 
the concept of foreign sovereign immunity, the issues with absolute 
                                                                                                     
 123. See id. at 137–38 (“[T]he chief reporter for the Restatement [(Third) of 
Foreign Relations Law], Professor Henkin, has asserted elsewhere that foreign 
states simply ‘have no constitutional rights’ in the United States.”); Lori Fisler 
Damrosch, Foreign States and the Constitution, 73 VA. L. REV. 483, 487 (1987) 
(“To the extent that the Constitution is a social contract establishing a system of 
self-government, permanent outsiders such as foreign states seem to have little 
claim to invoke constitutional ‘rights’ against domestic political decisions.”).  
 124. See Damrosch, supra note 123, at 489 (“[C]onstitutional claims against 
the actions of the federal political branches must fail on the merits because of the 
relationship of foreign states to the federal structure.”). 
 125. Id.  
 126. See Frederick Watson Vaughan, Foreign States are Foreign States: Why 
Foreign State-Owned Corporations Are Not Persons Under the Due Process 
Clause, 45 GA. L. REV. 913, 933 (2011) (describing references to foreign entities in 
the Constitution).  
 127. See id. (noting that the purpose of the Constitution was to provide rights 
for citizens, not foreign entities).  
142 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 123 (2019) 
immunity that led to the FSIA, and the purpose behind the 
commercial activities exception.  
 
A. Sovereign Immunity in International Law 
The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity reflects the 
fundamental principle of international law that a foreign 
government and its instrumentalities shall not be subjected to 
another sovereign’s domestic adjudication without its consent.128 
The ideas of sovereign independence of states and the dignity of 
coequal sovereigns are central to the notion of immunity.129 
Historically, the doctrine developed as an attempt to strike a 
balance of power between the nation-states of Europe.130 At the 
time, the doctrine required states to refrain from action that would 
impede another state’s ability to manage its internal affairs.131 
The United States judiciary first recognized foreign sovereign 
immunity in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.132 The U.S. 
plaintiff brought suit claiming rightful ownership of a vessel owned 
by France but found docked in a Philadelphia port.133 The Court 
explained that each nation has exclusive and absolute jurisdiction 
over everything in its own territory.134 However, Chief Justice 
                                                                                                     
 128. See Daniel P. Roy III, (Don’t) Take Another Little Piece of My Immunity 
Baby: The Application of Agency Principles to Claims of Foreign Sovereign 
Immunity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1283, 1290 (2015) (“Sovereign immunity is 
understood to naturally flow from the bedrock principles of this system, namely 
the inviolability and equality of sovereign states . . . .” (internal citations 
omitted)).  
 129. See Andrew B. Pittman, Ambassadorial Waiver of Foreign State 
Sovereign Immunity to Domestic Adjudication in United States Courts, 58 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 645, 650 (2001) (describing that an exercise of authority over 
another state historically signified hostility). 
 130. See David P. Vandenberg, In the Wake of Republic of Austria v. Altmann: 
The Current Status of Foreign Sovereign Immunity in United States Courts, 77 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 739, 740 (2006) (tracing the initial system of sovereign immunity to 
the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia).  
 131. See id. at 740 (noting that sovereignty was essential to promoting 
stability). 
 132. See 11 U.S. 116, 136 (1812) (determining that a foreign sovereign could 
not be subject to another sovereign’s judicial process without consent).   
 133. See id. at 147 (detailing the seizing of the ship in a Philadelphia port). 
 134. See id. at 136 (“The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is 
necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed 
by itself.”). 
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Marshall reasoned that any foreign sovereign coming within the 
territory of another foreign sovereign does so under an express or 
implied understanding of immunity—to hold otherwise would 
compromise the principles of independent sovereign nations.135 
Consequently, the French sovereign owner of the ship was 
protected from the jurisdiction of the United States court by an 
implied grant of immunity.136 This decision laid the judicial 
framework for recognizing that law and practice of nations 
supported granting absolute immunity.137 This practice continued 
for the next century and a half as the United States repeatedly 
granted absolute immunity, even as tensions about the doctrine 
arose. For example, in Berizzi Brothers Co. v. Pesaro,138 the Court 
refused to accept the State Department’s view that the United 
States should not grant immunity to foreign vessels engaged in 
commerce.139 The Supreme Court relied on The Schooner Exchange 
holding to extend immunity in an action against a merchant ship 
owned by the Italian government engaged in commerce in New 
York.140 The Court essentially refuted what the FSIA would later 
codify as the commercial activities exception.141 
                                                                                                     
 135. See id. at 137 (“This full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike 
the attribute of every sovereign, and being incapable of conferring 
extra-territorial power, would not seem to contemplate foreign sovereigns nor 
their sovereign rights as its objects.”). 
 136. See id. at 147 (“[T]he [ship] . . . must be considered as having come into 
the American territory, under an implied promise, that while necessarily within 
it . . . she should be exempt from the jurisdiction of the country.”). 
 137. See id. at 136 (“All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power 
of a nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the 
nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source.”). 
 138. 271 U.S. 562 (1926). 
 139. See Michael E. Jansen, FSIA Retroactivity Subsequent to the Issuance of 
the Tate Letter: A Proposed Solution to the Confusion, 10 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 
333, 345 (1989) (noting the rising tension over immunity between the political 
and Judicial Branches).  
 140. See Berizzi Brothers Co., 271 U.S. at 572 (“This full and absolute 
territorial jurisdiction being alike the attribute of every sovereign, and being 
incapable of conferring extraterritorial power, would not seem to contemplate 
foreign sovereigns nor their sovereign rights as its objects.”). 
 141. See id. (demonstrating the Court’s lack of deference to State Department 
wishes). 
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B. Concerns Leading to the FSIA 
The doctrine of absolute foreign sovereign immunity became 
more complicated in the twentieth century with the rise of foreign 
states and entities in international commerce.142 Traditional policy 
concerns protecting a state’s military, economic, and political 
activities from undue infringement remained valid concerns; 
however, as foreign enterprises increasingly entered commercial 
trade, private parties had no judicial remedy if a foreign state 
harmed their economic interests.143 Immunity provided an unfair 
advantage to foreign states interacting with the private sector.144  
In response, the theory of immunity divided into two distinct 
practices. Some states maintained absolute sovereign immunity, 
while other states denied immunity in situations where the claim 
was commercial or purely private.145 This second application, 
known as the restrictive theory of immunity, emphasized the idea 
that immunity should not apply to all types of state action.146 
While the United States still practiced the theory of absolute 
immunity, many nations adopted the restrictive theory of 
sovereign immunity, subjecting the United States to suits in the 
countries to which it granted immunity.147  
Despite the shift in other states to the restrictive theory of 
sovereign immunity, the federal courts continued to apply absolute 
immunity as a way to defer political questions to the Executive 
Branch or Congress.148 In Compania Espanola de Navegacion 
                                                                                                     
 142. See Roy, supra note 128, at 1291 (emphasizing increased criticism of 
absolute immunity during this time). 
 143. See Pittman, supra note 129, at 652 (highlighting a shift in contemporary 
policy rationales). 
 144. See Mark B. Feldman, The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act of 1976 in Perspective: A Founder’s View, 35 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 302, 303 (1986) 
(noting the protection foreign states enjoyed in private commerce). 
 145. See Vandenberg, supra note 130, at 741 (noting that primarily the 
European powers began the more restrictive movement).  
 146. See id. at 742 (describing the commercial and private suits as 
nonpolitical state action). 
 147. See Roy, supra note 128, at 1291–92 (noting the asymmetrical 
application of immunity). 
 148. See Republic of Mex. v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945) (“It is therefore 
not for the courts to deny an immunity which our government has seen fit to 
allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds which the government has not 
seen fit to recognize.”); Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 311 (1918) (“The 
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Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar,149 the Supreme Court declared 
that extending sovereign immunity was primarily the right of the 
Executive Branch.150 Generally, the courts would defer to the 
Executive’s decision on immunity; however, if the Executive gave 
no input, the courts were competent to make their own 
determinations.151  
In 1952, Jack Tate, the Acting Legal Adviser of the State 
Department, issued a letter, known as the Tate Letter, adopting 
the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity as the Department’s 
policy.152 The driving force behind the adoption was the inequality 
that stemmed from applying absolute immunity when so many 
other states practiced restrictive immunity.153 Following the Tate 
Letter, the State Department continued to make suggestions to the 
courts using a uniform approach of restrictive sovereign 
immunity.154 This process created a problem by allowing the 
Executive Branch to have power over judicial procedure.155 While 
prior decisions defaulted to absolute immunity, decisions following 
the Tate Letter required courts to consider the State Department’s 
recommendation instead of automatically granting absolute 
                                                                                                     
conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the 
Constitution to . . . ‘the political’[] departments of the government, and the 
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject 
to judicial inquiry or decision.”). 
 149. 303 U.S. 68 (1938). 
 150. See id. at 74 (“If the claim is recognized and allowed by the Executive 
Branch of the government, it is then the duty of the courts to release the vessel 
upon appropriate suggestion by the Attorney General of the United States, or 
other officer acting under his direction.”).  
 151. See id. at 76 (proceeding to determine immunity status).   
 152. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser of the U.S. Dep’t of 
State, to Acting Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 
26 DEP’T ST. BULL. 984 (1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter]; Jansen, supra note 139, 
at 334 (describing the letter as the Department’s formal adoption of restrictive 
immunity).  
 153. See Tate Letter, supra note 152, (“[T]he Department feels that the 
widespread and increasing practice on the part of governments of engaging in 
commercial activities makes necessary a practice which will enable persons doing 
business with them to have their rights determined in the courts.”). 
 154. See Vandenberg, supra note 130, at 745 (discussing the impact of using 
the same procedure with a different standard).  
 155. See id. (describing that the State Department had penultimate power 
over the courts). 
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immunity.156 If a foreign state did not involve the State 
Department, courts made the sole decision on immunity.157 The 
State Department’s recommendations often turned on the identity 
of the sovereign defendant, rather than the nature of the claim.158 
Further, the State Department was not legally obligated to inform 
parties pursuing a claim against a foreign sovereign that it was 
recommending immunity.159 Varying input on immunity from both 
the Judicial and Executive Branches led to unpredictable 
decisions.160 The post-Tate Letter application negatively impacted 
the legal standards for immunity, foreign relations, and private 
litigants.161 As foreign states increasingly engaged in commercial 
activities resulting in disputes, the State and Justice Departments 
urged Congress to act.162  
C. Goals of the FSIA 
                                                                                                     
 156. See Yonatan Lupu & Clay Risen, Retroactive Application of the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act: Landgraf Analysis and the Political Question Doctrine, 
8 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 239, 243–44 (noting that courts had difficulty 
distinguishing between a foreign sovereign’s public acts and private acts for 
determining immunity). 
 157. See id. at 244 (emphasizing that State Department intervention was 
significant during this period). 
 158. See Stella Havkin, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: The 
Relationship Between the Commercial Activity Exception and the Noncommercial 
Tort Exception in Light of De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 10 
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 455, 461 (1987) (“Judicial decisions were 
influenced so significantly by executive advice that foreign sovereigns often 
applied directly to the State Department to acquire a grant of immunity.”).  
 159. See id. (detailing that plaintiffs were subjected to harm due to a lack of 
knowledge). 
 160. See Lupu & Risen, supra note 156, at 244 (discussing the unclear 
rulemaking resulting from split branch intervention). 
 161. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487 (1976), at 8–9, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6604, 6605 (detailing the conflicting legal input from the Executive and 
Legislative Branches, the incentive for foreign states to exert diplomatic 
influences, and the uncertainty to private litigants). 
 162. See David E. Gohlke, Clearing the Air or Muddying the Waters? Defining 
“a Direct Effect in the United States” Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
After Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 18 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 261, 267 (1995) 
(emphasizing a motivation to eliminate politically motivated, inconsistent 
application of immunity). 
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Congress passed the FSIA to resolve this growing 
inconsistency. The FSIA provides the sole method of obtaining 
jurisdiction over a foreign state.163 The Act set out to achieve four 
main objectives:164 (1) to codify the restrictive principle of 
sovereign immunity;165 (2) to ensure uniform application of 
immunity;166 (3) to provide a statutory procedure for making 
service on a foreign state;167 and (4) to provide relief for a plaintiff 
with a judgment against a foreign state.168 One of the major driving 
forces behind passing the FSIA was to transfer decision-making 
power from the political branches to the Judicial Branch.169  
The structure of the legislation removed executive influence 
and provided principles for courts to use to determine jurisdiction 
over claims against foreign states.170 The structure of the Act 
maintains a presumption of immunity against a foreign state.171 
Thereafter, Congress carved out exceptions to the rule, codifying 
the restrictive principle of sovereign immunity that not all state 
action is out of the reach of United States courts.172 The Act’s 
presumption of immunity, with limited, specific exceptions, 
intended to balance providing a remedy for an injured party with 
                                                                                                     
 163. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 
434 (1989) (determining that the text and structure of the FSIA demonstrate 
Congress’s intent for it to be the sole basis of U.S. court jurisdiction over a foreign 
state). 
 164. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 161, at 7 (stating the urgent need 
for the legislation). 
 165. See id. (noting that the Department of State and U.S. courts had already 
adopted the narrower theory of immunity).  
 166. See id. (highlighting that a key feature of the Act was to transfer 
immunity decisions from the Executive Branch to the Judicial Branch).  
 167. See id. at 8 (remarking that the Act eliminates the need for the practice 
of seizing and attaching the property of a foreign government to obtain 
jurisdiction). 
 168. See id. (restricting the broad immunity in “ordinary commercial 
litigation”). 
 169. See Joseph Dellapenna, Interpreting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act: Reading or Construing the Text, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 555, 563 (2011) 
(noting that Congress sought “to depoliticize immunity decisions by vesting them 
in courts”).  
 170. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 717 (2004) (describing 
how the structure shifts the decision to the courts).  
 171. See Dellapenna, supra note 169, at 564 (detailing how Congress 
structured the FSIA). 
 172. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1605(a)(1)–(5), (b), 1607 (2012). 
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avoiding undue intrusion into a foreign state’s affairs.173 
Additionally, the Act sought to protect the State Department from 
embarrassing foreign affairs mishaps.174 Lastly, the Act sought to 
overcome inconsistent legal application of immunity, both of 
foreign states in domestic courts and for the United States as a 
foreign sovereign compared to other states already practicing 
restrictive immunity.175  
When Congress determined what types of claims to exclude 
from immunity, its primary concern was commercial interaction 
between foreign states and United States citizens.176 Congress 
noted that, unlike other legal systems, the United States did not 
provide its citizens with a judicial remedy for legal disputes arising 
from foreign commercial activity.177 Accordingly, one of the 
exceptions to the FSIA’s general grant of immunity is the 
commercial activities exception.178 The commercial activities 
exception was Congress’s response to the increased participation 
of foreign state enterprises in global commerce.179 As a result, the 
FSIA broadly defines commercial activity to capture acts ranging 
from individual transactions to regular instances of commercial 
conduct.180 
                                                                                                     
 173. See Dellapenna, supra note 169, at 564 (describing the two biggest 
factors Congress balanced in drafting the FSIA). 
 174. See id. (noting the potential for embarrassment in doubtful cases). 
 175. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 161, at 7 (“U.S. immunity practice 
would conform to the practice in virtually every other country—where sovereign 
immunity decisions are made exclusively by the courts and not by a foreign affairs 
agency.”). 
 176. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 161, at 6 (emphasizing that the 
rise of commercial interaction between citizens and foreign states provided the 
most pressing need for an exception to immunity).  
 177. See id. (noting that U.S. law failed to provide a plaintiff with a way to 
obtain satisfaction of a final judgment against a foreign state).  
 178. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012) (providing that a foreign state is not 
granted immunity for certain commercial activities).  
 179. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 161, at 7 (describing the urgent 
need for legislation concerning foreign states in global commerce).  
 180. See 28 U.S.C. §1603(d) (“The commercial character of an activity shall be 
determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular 
transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose.”). 
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D. The Commercial Activities Exception 
The commercial activities exception consists of three clauses 
premised on the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.181 Each 
clause of the exception defines commercial action not protected by 
foreign sovereign immunity.182 The first clause provides an 
exception to immunity when the claim arises from commercial 
activity performed within United States territory.183 The second 
clause provides an exception to immunity for an act performed in 
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the 
foreign state elsewhere.184 The third clause—the direct effect 
clause—provides an exception for the act of a foreign state outside 
of the United States that causes a direct effect within the United 
States.185 This clause involves the most attenuated contacts with 
the United States of the three clauses.186 Specifically, the clause 
provides:  
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the 
courts of the United States or of the States in any case . . . in 
which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on 
in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act 
performed in the United States in connection with a commercial 
activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside 
the territory of the United States in connection with a 
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act 
causes a direct effect in the United States[.]187 
                                                                                                     
 181. See Joseph F. Morrissey, Simplifying the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act: If a Sovereign Acts Like a Private Party, Treat It Like One, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
675, 682 (2005) (describing the commercial activities exception as “the heart of 
restrictive theory of immunity”).  
 182. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 161, at 18 (stating that the 
commercial activities exception as the most important instance where a foreign 
state is denied immunity).  
 183. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012) (requiring the activity to take place in 
U.S. territory before a court can assert jurisdiction over the foreign state). 
 184. See id. (detailing the second clause of the commercial activities 
exception). 
 185. See id. (detailing the third clause of the commercial activities exception). 
 186. See Working Group of the American Bar Ass’n, Reforming the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 489, 555 (2002) (discussing 
that the first clause requires conduct partially or wholly in U.S. territory, while 
the third clause requires only a direct effect in the U.S.). 
 187. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012). 
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Congress defined “commercial activity” as “either a regular 
course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial 
transaction or act.”188 By allowing courts to rely on an activity’s 
commercial nature in determining immunity, the exception sought 
to (1) discourage forum-shopping, and (2) make its application 
more effective by preventing a foreign government from claiming 
a public purpose for its commercial transactions.189  
The House Report states that commercial activity is subject to 
U.S. jurisdiction consistent with the Restatement (Second) of 
Foreign Relations Law.190 For jurisdiction, the Restatement 
dictates that the effect of the conduct must be substantial, and 
occur as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct.191 The 
purpose of requiring the connection to the United States ensures 
(1) an appropriate foundation for applying domestic law, and (2) 
statutory support for section 1330(a), which permits a court to 
assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant.192  
                                                                                                     
 188. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (2012). It appears Congress intended to define 
“commercial activity” broadly. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 161, at 16 
(“Certainly, if an activity is customarily carried on for profit, its commercial 
nature could readily be assumed.”). 
 189. See M. Mofidi, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the 
“Commercial Activity” Exception: The Gulf Between Theory and Practice, 5 J. INT’L 
LEGAL STUD. 95, 103 (1999) (describing the objectives of the FSIA’s reliance on an 
activity’s commercial nature). 
 190. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 161, at 19 (proscribing jurisdiction 
consistent with the Restatement). 
 191. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 18 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) 
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal 
consequences to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an 
effect within its territory, if either[:] 
 
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent 
elements of a crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably 
developed legal systems, or 
 
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to 
which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; 
(iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside 
the territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of 
justice generally recognized by states that have reasonably developed 
legal systems. 
 192. See Working Group of the American Bar Ass’n, supra note 186, at 556 
(discussing the purpose of the connection requirement). 
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In examining the intended jurisdictional reach of the 
commercial activities exception, it is useful to examine the 
language that Congress used in similar exceptions to the FSIA. 
The FSIA provides an exception, commonly referred to as the 
noncommercial tort exception, which provides relief for tortious 
acts or omissions by a foreign state occurring in the United 
States.193 The statute provides jurisdiction for claims not covered 
under the commercial activities exception.194 This exception 
resolves the problem tort victims face in obtaining jurisdiction over 
foreign states.195 Courts have interpreted the noncommercial tort 
exception to require a higher standard for jurisdiction—the act 
must occur within U.S. territory.196 Comparison of the express 
jurisdictional requirements found in the noncommercial tort 
exception and the direct effect clause of the commercial activities 
exception supports the contention that if Congress intended 
stricter jurisdictional requirements for the direct effect clause, it 
would have written it into the statute. 
IV. Progression of the Minimum Contacts Analysis 
Following the passage of the FSIA, courts disagreed on 
defining a “direct effect” and what the Act required to assert 
personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court first addressed the 
confusion in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.197 concluding 
                                                                                                     
 193. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (2012) (outlining the exception for a tortious 
act or omission of a foreign state). 
 194. See id. 
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of 
the United States or of the States in any case . . . in which money 
damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or 
death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States 
and caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of 
any official or employee of that foreign state while acting within the 
scope of his office or employment. 
 195. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 161, at 20–21 (extending the 
exception generally to all torts not covered by the commercial activities 
exception). 
 196. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 
439 (1989) (limiting jurisdiction under the noncommercial tort exception to events 
occurring within United States territory).  
 197. 504 U.S. 607 (1992). 
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that the direct effect clause did not require foreseeability or 
substantiality, only that the effect flowed immediately from the 
defendant’s action.198 The Court did not specifically address 
whether a foreign state must possess the requisite minimum 
contacts with the United States set forth in International Shoe Co. 
v. Washington199 in order for U.S. courts to assert personal 
jurisdiction under the direct effect clause of the FSIA’s commercial 
activities exception.200 Instead, Weltover merely acknowledged 
that if minimum contacts were necessary, the foreign entity in that 
case possessed the requisite contacts for personal jurisdiction.201  
Following Weltover, the Ninth and Sixth Circuits reached 
opposite conclusions on whether the direct effect clause of the 
commercial activities exception to immunity required that a 
foreign entity have minimum contacts with the United States. The 
Ninth Circuit required that a foreign state possess minimum 
contacts before personal jurisdiction was appropriate.202 However, 
the Sixth Circuit explicitly rejected the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation, determining that personal jurisdiction was 
satisfied without establishing minimum contacts.203  
A. Early Interpretation of the Direct Effect Clause 
After the passage of the FSIA, the majority of circuits adopted 
a narrower interpretation of activities with a “direct effect” on the 
United States.204 This reading incorporated the “substantial and 
foreseeable” elements found in the FSIA’s legislative history’s 
                                                                                                     
 198. See id. at 618 (rejecting that the clause imposes a higher standard).   
 199. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 200. See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 619 (stating that the Court would assume, 
without deciding, that a foreign state is a person for due process purposes). 
 201. See id. at 619–20 (determining that the foreign entity established 
minimum contacts by issuing debt instruments in U.S. dollars and appointing a 
financial agent in New York). 
 202. See infra Part IV.C (outlining the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the 
FSIA’s minimum contacts requirement). 
 203. See infra Part IV.D (discussing the Sixth Circuit’s statutory 
interpretation of the FSIA’s jurisdictional requirements). 
 204. See Gohlke, supra note 162, at 274 (noting that while the Second Circuit 
adopted the “broad view,” five other circuits that considered cases brought under 
the direct effect clause adopted the “narrow view” requiring substantiality and 
foreseeability).  
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reference to the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law.205 
The Restatement suggests that jurisdiction is appropriate where 
the effect is substantial, or occurs as a direct and foreseeable result 
of the conduct outside the Unites States.206 In Harris Corp. v. 
National Iranian Radio and Television,207 the Eleventh Circuit 
was the first of five circuits to adopt this “substantial and 
foreseeable” interpretation of the direct effect clause.208 Harris, a 
U.S. corporation, entered into an agreement with National Iranian 
Radio and Television (NIRT) for delivery of broadcast transmitters 
to Tehran.209 Shortly after the agreement, Harris was unable to 
complete delivery due to the violence that erupted during the 
Iranian Revolution.210 Harris sought a declaratory judgment that 
the contract was terminated due to force majeure.211 NIRT 
challenged the district court’s jurisdiction to enter a preliminary 
injunction.212 The court determined that the effects of the contract 
in the United States were foreseeable enough to subject NIRT to 
jurisdiction under the direct effect clause of the commercial 
activities exception.213  
The District of Columbia Circuit adopted the same standard 
in Maritime International Nominees Establishment v. Republic of 
                                                                                                     
 205. See Nicolas J. Evanoff, Direct Effect Jurisdiction Under the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Ending the Chaos in the Circuit Courts, 28 
HOUS. L. REV. 629, 639–40 (1991) (describing the prevailing interpretation before 
the Weltover decision). 
 206. See supra note 191 (outlining the Restatement’s jurisdictional 
requirements).  
 207. 691 F.2d 1344 (1982).  
 208. See id. at 1351 (describing that the clause applies to acts that Congress 
would want an American court to hear).  
 209. See id. at 1346–47 (noting that the agreement contained a provision 
releasing the performance guarantee upon termination due to force majeure). 
 210. See id. at 1348 (stating Harris’s argument that it could not ship to Iran 
without a special license issued only in emergency situations or for humanitarian 
reasons). 
 211. See id. at 1348–49 (noting Harris’s inability to ship materials due to the 
violent conditions in Iran, thereby forcing Harris to fail to adhere to the contract 
terms).  
 212. See id. at 1349 (stating that the foreign entity claimed it had sovereign 
immunity under the FSIA). 
 213. See id. at 1351 (“The letter . . . extends into this country, and the 
appellants’ demands thus have significant, foreseeable financial consequences 
here.”). 
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Guinea,214 relying on the legislative history of the FSIA in its 
decision to apply the substantial and foreseeable standard.215 The 
case involved a Liechtenstein corporation, Maritime International, 
that petitioned a D.C. district court to confirm an arbitration 
award against the Republic of Guinea for a breach of contract.216 
Maritime claimed that jurisdiction was proper because a portion of 
the contract activities were performed within the United States by 
a company, Global, and that Global suffered financial losses upon 
breach of the contract.217  
The D.C. Circuit found that there was no direct effect because 
the claim was based on conduct not reasonably contemplated by 
the commercial activity.218 Critical to the court’s analysis was an 
examination of the legislative history of the direct effect clause, 
particularly the reference to Section 18 of the Restatement 
(Second) Foreign Relations Law concerning jurisdiction.219 The 
court noted that “[a]lthough section 18 is therefore concerned with 
legislative rather than judicial action, Congress’s clear reference 
has led some courts to find guidance in section 18’s requirement 
that the effect be ‘substantial’ and ‘occur’ as a direct and 
foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory.”220 
Following the decision in Maritime International, three other 
circuits adopted the substantial and foreseeable test.221 
                                                                                                     
 214. 693 F.2d 1094 (1982). 
 215. See id. at 1111 (finding clear reference to the Restatement in the FSIA’s 
legislative history). 
 216. See id. at 1096 (noting that the Liechtenstein corporation asserted 
jurisdiction under the FSIA). 
 217. See id. at 1106 (noting that Global maintained an office in Stamford, 
Connecticut).   
 218. See id. at 1111 (“Only if involvement such as Global’s was reasonably 
contemplated under the [agreement] can we view as ‘direct’ the injuries resulting 
from that involvement.”). 
 219. See id. at 1110 (examining the portion of the House Report dealing with 
jurisdiction of the statute).  
 220. Id.  
 221. See Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445, 453 (6th Cir. 
1988) (determining that an economic injury to a U.S. corporation was a direct 
effect where the corporation was the primary victim of the act and the economic 
consequences were foreseeable); Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1111 
(5th Cir. 1985) (deciding that the legislative history of the FSIA requires a direct 
and foreseeable standard); Berkovitz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 735 F.2d 329, 
332 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1035 (1984) (determining that the 
effects on the immediate family of a U.S. citizen murdered in Iran were not 
IF THE SHOE FITS 155 
The Second Circuit rejected the substantial and foreseeable 
standard in Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of 
Nigeria,222 determining that the jurisdictional guidelines in the 
FSIA’s legislative history were not applicable to interpreting the 
direct effect clause.223 The case involved the Nigerian 
government’s repudiation of contracts with four American 
corporations.224 The Nigerian government sought to increase its 
infrastructure for its oil-exporting operations and contracted to 
purchase mass quantities of cement.225 The contracts provided for 
a New York bank to make the payments to each corporation 
providing the cement.226 Nigeria drastically overestimated the 
amount of cement it could physically accept in its port facilities, 
and shortly after the plaintiffs began delivery of the cement, 
Nigeria’s ports were overwhelmed and stopped processing the 
deliveries.227 After a few months, Nigeria canceled the contracts 
with the cement suppliers, and refused to accept further delivery 
or make payment to the corporations.228 The plaintiff corporations 
sued in the Southern District of New York, claiming Nigeria’s 
actions constituted anticipatory breaches of the contracts.229 In 
                                                                                                     
sufficiently direct or foreseeable to assert jurisdiction). 
 222. 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), overruled by Frontera Res. Azer. Corp. v. 
State Oil Co. of Azer. Republic, 582 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 223. See id. at 311 (finding that Congress relied on principles of jurisdiction 
concerning applying American law to conduct overseas, not the proper 
extraterritorial jurisdictional reach of American courts). 
 224. See id. at 303 (noting that all of the plaintiffs’ contracts required 
delivering 240,000 metric tons of cement to Nigeria). 
 225. See id. (stating that the four plaintiffs represented four of the 109 
contracts Nigeria executed to obtain mass quantities of cement for its 
infrastructure project).  
 226. See id. at 304 (noting that the actual financial arrangement operated 
differently from the terms of the contract, and that the sellers presented 
documents for payment to a separate bank in New York). 
 227. See id. at 305 (stating that while Nigeria’s port facilities could only accept 
one to five million tons of cement per year, the government contracted for over 
sixteen million tons in eighteen months). 
 228. See id. at 305–06 (discussing that while forty corporations settled with 
the Nigerian government, dozens more sued in courts all over the world).  
 229. See id. at 306 (noting that the Nigerian government did not contest that 
their actions constituted an anticipatory breach).  
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response, Nigeria asserted its defense of immunity under the 
FSIA.230 
The Second Circuit used the case as an opportunity to dive into 
the tangled legislative history of the FSIA—particularly the direct 
effect clause of the commercial activities exception.231 The court 
determined that the FSIA’s purpose was not to significantly 
restrict jurisdiction, but to standardize the exercise of jurisdiction 
over foreign states.232 The opinion rejected the idea that the House 
Report’s reference to the Restatement (Second) Foreign Relations 
Law defined the appropriate jurisdictional reach of the direct effect 
clause, calling it “a bit of a non sequitur” because section 18 
concerned applying American law overseas.233 The Second Circuit 
determined that when analyzing if a commercial activity had a 
direct effect in the United States, the substantial or foreseeable 
test was unnecessary; rather the court should ask “was the effect 
sufficiently ‘direct’ and sufficiently ‘in the United States’ that 
Congress would have wanted an American court to hear the 
case?”234 
The Second Circuit’s holding in Texas Trading created a split 
with the majority of circuits that adopted requirements of 
substantiality and foreseeability.235 Following the inconsistent 
interpretations among the circuits, the Supreme Court provided 
guidance on exercising jurisdiction under the direct effect clause in 
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.236  
                                                                                                     
 230. See id. (outlining Nigeria’s assertion that the court did not have personal 
jurisdiction).  
 231. See id. at 307 (“These cases present an opportunity to untie the FSIA’s 
Gordian knot, and to vindicate the Congressional purposes behind the Act.”). 
 232. See id. at 313 (discussing that prior to the FSIA, jurisdiction over foreign 
states was irregular and subject to State Department discretion).  
 233. See id. at 311 (“[Section] 18 concerns the extent to which substantive 
American law may be applied to conduct overseas, not the proper extraterritorial 
jurisdictional reach of American courts n’importe quelle substantive law.”). 
 234. See id. at 313 (arguing that a rigid parsing of the direct effect clause leads 
to results contrary to the congressional intent to provide U.S. courts jurisdiction 
over cases such as this one). 
 235. See Gohkle, supra note 162, at 279 (discussing the need for a uniform 
direct effect test). 
 236. 504 U.S. 607 (1992). 
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B. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. 
In 1992, the Supreme Court attempted to provide clarity on 
the application of the direct effect clause in its opinion in Republic 
of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.237 In Weltover, several bondholders 
brought a breach of contract action against the Republic of 
Argentina and its central bank arising out of Argentina’s 
unilateral extension of the time for payment on bonds issued as 
part of a currency stabilization plan.238 Weltover required the 
Court to decide if Argentina’s default on bonds issued as part of its 
domestic currency stabilization plan provided an exception to 
Argentina’s sovereign immunity under the direct effect clause.  
Before the Argentine government and central bank 
implemented its plan, Argentine businesses engaged in foreign 
transactions using internationally accepted currency instead of the 
Argentine currency.239 To help Argentine businesses access 
accepted international currencies, Argentina established a foreign 
exchange insurance contract program (FEIC).240 This program 
allowed Argentinian businesses with debt in U.S. dollars to pay the 
central bank a contractually predetermined amount of 
Argentinian currency.241 In exchange for the payment, the bank 
gave the debtors the U.S. dollars necessary to repay the initial 
loan.242  
As the FEIC contracts became due, Argentina did not have 
sufficient funds to make the required payments.243 Argentina’s 
solution was refinancing the FEIC debts by issuing government 
bonds to the creditors.244 These bonds provided for payment in U.S. 
                                                                                                     
 237. 504 U.S. 607 (1992). 
 238. Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Arg., 753 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 941 
F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1991), aff’d, 504 U.S. 607 (1992). 
 239. See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 609 (highlighting that Argentinian currency 
was not accepted on the international market). 
 240. See id. (detailing Argentina’s solution to help its financially struggling 
businesses).  
 241. See id. (noting that Argentina effectively assumed the risk of currency 
depreciation in cross-border transactions involving Argentine borrowers). 
 242. See id. (stating that Argentina offered this exchange regardless of 
intervening devaluations).  
 243. See id. (describing Argentina’s lack of U.S. currency reserves to make 
payments on the contracts). 
 244. See id. (noting that these bonds, called “Bonods,” provided Argentina an 
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dollars, and creditors could obtain payment through transfer on 
multiple major international markets.245 When the bonds began to 
mature, Argentina still lacked sufficient funds to make the 
payments and notified bondholders that the bank would not make 
timely payments on the bonds.246 The Weltover plaintiffs, two 
Panamanian corporations and one Swiss bank, refused Argentina’s 
delay and substitute bonds, and demanded full payment in New 
York.247 When Argentina did not pay, the plaintiffs brought a 
breach of contract action in district court, claiming jurisdiction 
under the FSIA commercial activities exception.248 
The controversy required the Supreme Court to evaluate 
whether Argentina’s unilateral refinancing created a direct effect 
in the United States.249 The Court turned its attention to the 
argument that the FSIA’s legislative history indicates that an act 
causes a direct effect only when it is both substantial and 
foreseeable. The Court interprets the House Report as a limit on 
legislating, not adjudicating, the issue:  
That suggestion is found in the House Report, which states that 
conduct covered by the third clause of § 1605(a)(2) would be 
subject to the jurisdiction of American courts “consistent with 
principles set forth in section 18, Restatement of the Law, 
Second, Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
(1965). Section 18 states that American laws are not given 
extraterritorial application except with respect to conduct that 
has, as a “direct and foreseeable result,” a “substantial” effect 
within the United States. . . . [T]his obviously deals with 
jurisdiction to legislate rather than jurisdiction 
to adjudicate . . . .250 
                                                                                                     
emergency solution to the insufficient funds). 
 245. See id. at 609–10 (noting that these markets included London, 
Frankfurt, Zurich, or New York). 
 246. See id. at 610 (stating that Argentina unilaterally extended the payment 
deadline by Presidential Decree). 
 247. See id. (detailing that the corporations and bank collectively held $1.3 
million in Argentinian bonds). 
 248. See id. at 611 (describing the commercial activities exception as the most 
significant FSIA exception).  
 249. See id. at 612 (stating what the Court first had to address if the act was 
commercial activity before moving on to the direct effect question).  
 250. Id. at 617–18 (citation omitted).  
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While the Court recognized that a foreign entity must cause 
more than a trivial effect in order for the direct effect clause to 
apply,251 it declined to hold that the direct effect clause required 
substantiality or foreseeability.252 The Court affirmed the district 
court’s determination that an effect is direct if it follows as an 
immediate consequence of the foreign entity’s activity.253  
After it defined the meaning of “direct effect” in the United 
States, the Court swiftly disposed of the issue of whether the direct 
effect clause required a foreign state maintain minimum contacts. 
Argentina’s argument centered on the country’s right to 
constitutional due process.254 It argued that a nonresident 
defendant was entitled to constitutional due process protection, 
and that jurisdiction was appropriate only if it established 
minimum contacts by purposefully availing itself of the privilege 
of conducting business in the United States.255 Relying on that 
standard, Argentina contended that jurisdiction was improper for 
a number of reasons.256 First, mere foreseeability of being subject 
to U.S. court was an inadequate basis for jurisdiction.257 Second, 
the constitutional basis for jurisdiction requires purposeful acts of 
the defendant, not just unilateral acts of the plaintiff.258 According 
to Argentina, jurisdiction was improper because the act of calling 
                                                                                                     
 251. See id. at 618 (“Of course the generally applicable principle de minimis 
non curat lex ensures that jurisdiction may not be predicated on purely trivial 
effects in the United States.”). 
 252. See id. (rejecting to read any unexpressed requirements into the statute). 
 253. See id. (determining that the court of appeals correctly interpreted the 
meaning of “direct”). 
 254. See Brief for Petitioner, Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 
(1992) (No. 91-763), 1992 WL 526250, at *35–36 (“[W]ere the Act construed to 
extend jurisdiction to Petitioners’ conduct at issue here, it clearly would run afoul 
of the due process limits of the Constitution.”). 
 255. See id. at *36 (arguing that the Petitioners’ contacts with the forum are 
too insubstantial to survive constitutional scrutiny). 
 256. See id. at *37–39 (arguing that in addition to the constitutional due 
process concerns, the FSIA language and legislative history support the notion 
that jurisdiction is improper).  
 257. See id. at *37 (stating that though Argentina could have been aware of 
the Respondent’s ability to call for payment in New York, that fact alone does not 
provide the necessary contact with the U.S.). 
 258. See id. (“[T]he Court has made it clear that the unilateral actions of a 
plaintiff—whether foreseeable or not—also are an insufficient basis upon which 
to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.”). 
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for payment in New York does not provide the necessary contacts 
with the forum.259 Finally, even if Argentina maintained a 
connection with the United States, it was too attenuated for 
jurisdictional purposes.260 Argentina relied on the holding from 
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,261 where the Court 
determined that jurisdiction was only proper where a defendant 
maintained a “substantial connection” with the forum state—this 
occurred only when a defendant purposefully directed an action 
toward the forum.262 Argentina’s argument was grounded in the 
assumption that the foreign state was entitled to constitutional 
due process protections.263  
In response, Weltover contended that Argentina’s argument 
improperly merged the requirements for subject matter 
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction.264 Respondent’s looked to 
the language of the FSIA, arguing that personal jurisdiction under 
the direct effect clause did not require a constitutional analysis; 
subject matter jurisdiction combined with proper service under the 
statute resulted in statutory personal jurisdiction.265 Weltover 
emphasized that Argentina’s due process argument abandoned the 
FSIA’s plain language grant of personal jurisdiction in favor of a 
constitutional minimum contacts analysis.266  
                                                                                                     
 259. See id. at *37–38 (providing that performing contracts, conducting 
negotiations, and having employees constitute valid examples of minimum 
contacts).  
 260. See id. at *37 (arguing that selecting New York as one of multiple options 
for payment was not enough to establish contact with the U.S.). 
 261. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 262. See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text (outlining the Court’s 
purposeful availment argument).  
 263. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 254, at *39 (“[Argentina] clearly lacks 
the substantial connection with this country required as a constitutional 
minimum for jurisdiction.”). 
 264. See Brief for Respondent, Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 
(1992) (No. 91-763), 1993 WL 431511, at *14 (“Apparently recognizing that the 
language of the [FSIA] provides them no support, petitioners for the first time in 
this Court take the position that the “nexus” reference in the House Report is 
identical to the due process requirement for personal jurisdiction.”). 
 265. See id. at *14–15 (stating that 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605–1607 combined with 
service under 28 U.S.C. § 1608 grants statutory personal jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1330(a)-(b)).  
 266. See id. at *15–16 (“[Argentina’s] effort to abandon the statutory language 
of Section 1605(a)(2) in favor of their analysis of personal jurisdiction turns out to 
be the equivalent of jumping from the frying pan into the fire.”). 
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Because the Court had already determined that Argentina’s 
activity was commercial in nature and had a direct effect in the 
United States, it did not rule on the minimum contacts test 
argument and the constitutional due process challenge.267 The 
Court merely stated that if it were to apply a minimum contacts 
evaluation, Argentina’s transactions with the United States were 
sufficient for establishing the requisite minimum contacts.268  
This brief portion of the opinion left open the question of what 
role, if any, the minimum contacts test has in establishing personal 
jurisdiction under the direct effect clause of the commercial 
activities exception. The lack of clarity on the minimum contacts 
requirement set the stage for the current circuit split between the 
Ninth and Sixth Circuits.  
C. The Ninth Circuit’s Minimum Contacts Analysis 
 In Corzo v. Banco Central de Reserva del Peru,269 the 
Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its view that granting an exception to 
sovereign immunity under the direct effect clause requires a 
finding  that the foreign sovereign satisfies the minimum contacts 
test. In its decision, the court relied on its own precedent in 
Security Pacific National Bank v. Derderian,270 finding that 
jurisdiction required the foreign sovereign to maintain minimum 
contacts with the United States.271 Derderian, decided before the 
Supreme Court’s Weltover opinion, involved a U.S. bank that sued 
to recover for illegal conversion and forgery of a check.272 The 
                                                                                                     
 267. See Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992) 
(“Assuming, without deciding, that a foreign state is a ‘person’ for purposes of the 
Due Process Clause . . . we find that Argentina possessed ‘minimum contacts’ that 
would satisfy the constitutional test.”). 
 268. See id. at 619–20 (“By issuing negotiable debt instruments denominated 
in United States dollars and payable in New York and by appointing a financial 
agent in that city, Argentina ‘purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the [United States].’” (quoting Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985))). 
 269. 243 F.3d 519 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 270. 872 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 271. See id. at 286 (“Our conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the 
requirement of a ‘direct effect’ incorporates the minimum contacts standards of 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington.”). 
 272. See id. at 282 (stating that the defendant forger obtained $852,000). 
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defendant was a foreign bank, owned by the Mexican government, 
that accepted gold coins derived from the proceeds of the forged 
check.273 The court determined that the Mexican bank’s 
commercial activity was insufficient to cause a direct effect in the 
United States.274 The bank neither had offices or agents, nor was 
licensed to do business in the United States; therefore, the 
plaintiff’s claim rested solely on the bank’s act of accepting a 
deposit which failed to establish minimum contacts.275 The 
Derderian opinion was one of several pre-Weltover decisions that 
contributed to the initial inconsistent interpretation of the direct 
effect clause.276  
In 2001, The Ninth Circuit examined the minimum contacts 
issue again, this time with the guidance of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Weltover. In Corzo, Novotec (Corzo’s predecessor in 
interest), was a Peruvian company exporting computers made 
primarily from parts imported from the United States.277 Novotec 
brought a lawsuit in Peru against the Banco Central de Reserva 
del Peru (BCRP), the monetary authority of Peru.278 In 1988, the 
BCRP introduced a program for Peruvian exporters operating on 
the international market who suffered losses as a result of the 
exchange rates.279 The BCRP designed this compensation program 
in response to the negative impact that the decline of the Peruvian 
dollar had on companies like Novotec.280 Novotec submitted an 
                                                                                                     
 273. See id. (noting that following the forgery, $150,000 was taken from the 
U.S. to Mexico and deposited with the Mexican bank). 
 274. See id. at 286 (determining that if the court found jurisdiction 
appropriate in this case, it would subject all foreign sovereign banking 
institutions to U.S. jurisdiction merely by accepting funds from account holders). 
 275. See id. (“Therefore, under a minimum contacts analysis, [the bank’s] 
actions did not cause a ‘direct effect’ in the United States, as defined by the 
FSIA.”). 
 276. See infra Part IV.C.1. (detailing the various interpretations of the direct 
effect clause among the circuits after the implementation of the FSIA).   
 277. See Corzo, 243 F.3d at 521 (detailing Novotec’s reliance on U.S. imports). 
 278. See id. (noting that both parties agreed that the BCRP was “an arm of 
the Peruvian government,” immune from U.S. jurisdiction unless an FSIA 
exception applied). 
 279. See id. (stating that the BCRP gave companies the opportunity to apply 
to receive government compensation for the losses). 
 280. See id. (noting that losses occurred when the Peruvian currency declined 
between the time of purchase of imported components and the time of exporting 
the final product). 
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application to the BCRP claiming $400,000 in losses from exchange 
rate fluctuations.281  
When the BCRP denied Novotec’s application, Novotec 
brought suit in Peru for the original compensation amount plus 
interest.282 The case reached the Supreme Court of Peru, which 
affirmed a judgment for Novotec, and Novotec subsequently 
assigned its interest to Corzo.283 Shortly after, the Peruvian 
Supreme Court declared its own judgment null and void because 
the BCRP had been denied due process.284 This action was 
unprecedented and caused great controversy within the Peruvian 
government.285 Corzo was unable to obtain payment in Peru and 
filed a complaint to domesticate a foreign judgment in U.S. district 
court, seeking to attach the BCRP’s assets in the United States.286  
Corzo sought to establish jurisdiction under the commercial 
activities exception to the FSIA.287 Corzo initially argued that the 
FSIA granted jurisdiction under the first clause of the commercial 
activities exception, because the claim was based upon a 
commercial activity carried on in the United States by a foreign 
sovereign.288 Corzo claimed that BRCP’s maintaining assets in the 
United States constituted commercial activity.289 The court swiftly 
                                                                                                     
 281. See id. (detailing that in addition to this application, the BCRP had 
previously extended a line of credit to Novotec). 
 282. See id. (stating that Novotec sought recovery for additional losses 
incurred after the initial application was filed and denied). 
 283. See id. (discussing the case’s progress through the Peruvian appellate 
system). 
 284. See id. at 521–22 (describing that the Peruvian Supreme Court admitted 
the previous decision was issued by mistake). 
 285. See id. at 522 (detailing the Resolution of the National Council of the 
Judiciary, issued shortly after the decision, that alleges that the justices of the 
Peruvian Supreme Court issued a fraudulent judgment). 
 286. See id. (stating that the complaint alleged that Corzo as Novotec’s 
predecessor in interest had a valid and final judgment against the BCRP).  
 287. See id. at 524 (noting that Corzo also claimed jurisdiction under the FSIA 
waiver exception, which the court rejected). 
 288. See id. at 525 (“His action is ‘based upon’ this activity, Corzo argues, 
because he is seeking to attach those assets.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2018) (“A 
foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United 
States or of the States in any case . . . in which the action is based upon a 
commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state.”). 
 289. See Corzo v. Banco Cent. de Reserva del Peru, 243 F.3d 519, 525 (9th Cir. 
2001) (“The commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference 
to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than 
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rejected this argument as the exchange rate transaction was not 
commercial in nature.290  
The court then turned to Corzo’s argument that the BCRP’s 
refusal to pay caused a direct effect in the United States. Corzo 
claimed that the BCRP’s refusal to pay caused a cutoff of cash-flow, 
forcing Notovtec to breach contracts with computer companies in 
the United States.291 Using the Weltover standard, the court 
determined that any negative impact on companies within the 
United States did not flow as an immediate consequence of the 
BCRP’s activity.292 After the court determined that there was no 
direct effect, it continued on to address the issue of the BCRP’s 
minimum contacts.293 The court stated an additional requirement 
for personal jurisdiction—a foreign sovereign must maintain a 
connection with the United States consistent with the 
International Shoe minimum contacts standard.294 Because the 
transaction between the BCRP and Novotec occurred entirely 
within Peru, the court found no minimum contacts with the United 
States and refused to assert jurisdiction under the direct effect 
clause of the commercial activities exception.295 
D. The Sixth Circuit’s Plain Language Approach 
In 2016, the Sixth Circuit expressly rejected the idea that the 
direct effect clause of the commercial activities exception required 
minimum contacts in its decision in Rote v. Zel Custom 
Manufacturing LLC.296 The plaintiff in Rote suffered severe 
                                                                                                     
by reference to the purpose.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1602(d) (2012))). 
 290. See id. (“The difference is critical, because the denial of the exchange-rate 
application was not commercial activity, but a sovereign act.”). 
 291. See id. (stating that the United States companies injured as a result of 
the contract breaches allegedly constituted a direct effect). 
 292. See id. (noting the effects were secondary or incidental at best) (citing 
Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992))). 
 293. See id. at 525–26 (discussing the required nexus between the activity and 
the plaintiff’s cause of action).  
 294. See id. at 526 (“The fact that United States computer companies might 
have been affected by Novotec’s breaches is jurisdictionally irrelevant.” (citing 
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945)).  
 295. Id. 
 296. See 816 F.3d 383, 393 (6th Cir. 2016) (determining that incorporating a 
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injuries to his right hand after a round of ammunition exploded 
upon firing a rifle.297 The round that exploded came from a box of 
ammunition manufactured by Dirección General Fabricaciones 
Militares (DGFM).298 The defective ammunition was purchased 
online from Ammoman, a company based in New Jersey.299 
Rote filed a negligence and products liability suit against 
DGFM, alleging that DGFM manufactured the ammunition and 
introduced it into the stream of commerce.300 DGFM moved for 
dismissal, claiming that it had sovereign immunity as an 
instrumentality of the Republic of Argentina.301 DGFM’s argument 
hinged on its assertion that any wrongful act could not cause a 
direct effect in U.S. territory because it lacked “substantial” 
contacts with the United States.302 DGFM maintained that the 
FSIA’s legislative history demonstrated requirements of minimum 
jurisdictional contacts.303 
The court began its minimum contacts analysis by evaluating 
the plain language of the direct effect clause.304 Following the 
Supreme Court’s standard in Weltover, the court found it could give 
plain meaning to the phrase “causes a direct effect in the 
United States” without ambiguity; therefore, probing into the 
legislative history was unnecessary.305 Going further, the court 
                                                                                                     
minimum contacts analysis adds unnecessary requirements to the statute).  
 297. See id. at 387 (noting that the plaintiff received proper loading and firing 
instructions). 
 298. See id. (identifying the source of the ammunition).  
 299. See id. (noting that “[t]he complaint does not indicate from whom 
Ammoman purchased the ammunition”). 
 300. See id. (stating that the plaintiffs also alleged that DGFM defectively 
designed the rounds to have a protruding primer and that DGFM failed to provide 
adequate warnings). 
 301. See id. (noting DGFM’s claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction).  
 302. See id. at 391 (“In other words, DGFM asserts that subject-matter 
jurisdiction is only proper if personal jurisdiction over the foreign state complies 
with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”). 
 303. See id. at 391–92 (detailing DGFM’s argument that jurisdictional 
prerequisites found elsewhere in the law are interconnected with the FSIA’s 
jurisdiction). 
 304. See id. at 392 (“If the language of the statute is clear, then the inquiry is 
complete, and the court should look no further.” (quoting Brilliance Audio, Inc. v. 
Haights Cross Commc’n, Inc., 474 F.3d 365, 371 (6th Cir. 2007))). 
 305. See id. at 393 (noting that though the statute does not define the terms, 
the court will give them ordinary meaning if possible). 
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emphasized, “[E]ven if we do look at legislative history, DGFM’s 
argument is still unpersuasive where the legislative history is 
being used to inject into the statute additional ‘unexpressed 
requirement[s],’ rather than resolve any inherent ambiguity.”306 
Comparing its decision to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Weltover, the Sixth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court similarly 
rejected a foreign instrumentality’s argument that required 
reading into the legislative history to find requirements of 
substantiality and foreseeability in applying the direct effect 
clause.307 
The Sixth Circuit expressly critiqued the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation in Corzo, finding it overreaching and 
unpersuasive.308 The court stressed that the Ninth Circuit followed 
precedent that was inconsistent with Weltover: 
“Derderian pre-dates Weltover, and so the court did not have the 
benefit of Weltover’s admonishment that we must not read 
‘unexpressed requirements’ into the statute.”309 Thus, following 
the Sixth Circuit’s 2016 decision, courts remain split on whether 
the direct effect clause of the commercial activities exception 
requires a minimum contacts analysis. 
V. Eliminating the Minimum Contacts Analysis 
The direct effect clause of the FSIA commercial activities 
exception should not require that a foreign state possess minimum 
contacts with the United States before a federal court can assert 
personal jurisdiction. Two considerations support excluding the 
minimum contacts analysis. First, constitutional protections 
should not extend to foreign states. Second, incorporating a 
minimum contacts analysis is contrary to the purpose of the 
                                                                                                     
 306. Id. (citing Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992)). 
 307. See id. (“The Supreme Court . . . found that legislative history inapposite 
and rejected the idea that the Act intended an ‘unexpressed requirement of 
‘substantiality’ or ‘foreseeability.’’” (citing Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 
U.S. 607, 618 (1992))). 
 308. See id. at 395 (“In reading the ‘direct effect’ element, the Ninth Circuit 
went beyond the plain meaning of the FSIA’s terms and relied on the same 
legislative history we reject to read into the statute requirements that are simply 
not there.”). 
 309. Id. 
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commercial activities exception. In an applicable future case, the 
Supreme Court should adopt the Sixth Circuit’s holding that the 
direct effect clause does not require a minimum contacts analysis. 
The Sixth Circuit’s holding in Rote v. Zel Custom Manufacturing 
LLC310 correctly denies due process protection to a foreign state 
and accomplishes the purpose of the commercial activities 
exception—providing U.S. courts with the opportunity to 
adjudicate claims where Congress has expressly lifted a foreign 
state’s immunity. 
A. A Foreign State is Not a “Person” Under the Due Process 
Clause 
The Ninth Circuit’s conclusion in Corzo v. Banco Central de 
Reserva del Peru311 that personal jurisdiction under the direct 
effect clause requires minimum contacts relies on an assumption 
that the Due Process Clause applies to foreign states.312 A foreign 
state should not be considered a “person” for the purposes of due 
process; therefore, it is improper to extend it due process 
protection. Although the Supreme Court has examined applying 
the Due Process Clause to nontraditional entities, its analysis of 
domestic states provides the most helpful comparison.313 A foreign 
state should not receive constitutional protections that are denied 
to domestic states.314 The Supreme Court’s decision in South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach315 declined to extend due process 
protection to domestic states.316 The Court could not justify 
interpreting “person” under the Due Process Clause to include a 
state.317 If the Court cannot reasonably interpret “person” to 
                                                                                                     
 310. 816 F.3d 383 (6th Cir. 2016).  
 311. 243 F.3d 519 (9th Cir. 2001).  
 312. See id. at 526 (finding that personal jurisdiction was improper where the 
foreign sovereign had not established minimum contacts with the United States). 
 313. See supra Part II.B (outlining previous decisions applying due process 
protection to foreign corporations, aliens, and domestic states).  
 314. See supra notes 109–112 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s 
rejection of South Carolina’s argument that it was entitled to due process).  
 315. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
 316. See supra note 110 (discussing South Carolina’s argument that the 
Voting Rights Act deprived the state of due process).  
 317. See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 323–24 (determining that no court could 
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include a domestic state, it follows that a foreign state is also 
excluded from the definition of “person” under the Due Process 
Clause. When the Court in Weltover briefly addressed the concept 
of applying due process to a foreign state, it declined to make a 
decision; however, it referenced the Katzenbach decision, implying 
that the holding denying personhood to domestic states should also 
apply to foreign states.318 Several federal circuit courts have 
followed this line of reasoning when declining to extend due 
process to foreign states.319 It is inconsistent to extend 
constitutional protection to foreign states while at the same time 
declining to provide the same protection to domestic states.320 The 
Second Circuit recognized this discrepancy when it overruled its 
own precedent in Frontera Resources Azerbaijan Corporation v. 
State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic,321 where it determined 
that no compelling reason justified treating a foreign state as a 
“person” while simultaneously denying domestic states the same 
status.322  
Second, extending due process protection to foreign states is 
contrary to the structure of the Constitution and how foreign states 
relate to the federal structure.323 The Constitution anticipates 
foreign states participating in the U.S. judicial process, and Article 
III provides federal courts jurisdiction over a foreign state.324 
When the political branches have not spoken on a particular issue, 
it may be beneficial for a federal court to apply constitutional 
                                                                                                     
construe the definition of person to include a state). 
 318. See supra note 112–113 (discussing how federal courts have interpreted 
the portion of the Weltover opinion dealing with foreign states as persons).   
 319. See supra note 86 (listing courts that have declined to extend a minimum 
contacts analysis to a foreign state under the FSIA). 
 320. See Halverson, supra note 88, at 141 (arguing that not recognizing a 
foreign state as a “person” under the Due Process Clause is consistent with policy 
and case precedent). 
 321. 582 F.3d 393 (2d. Cir. 2009). 
 322. See supra notes 114–121 and accompanying text (outlining how the 
Second Circuit reevaluated its interpretation of “person” applied to foreign 
states). 
 323. See supra Part II.B (discussing issues that arise when foreign states 
receive constitutional protections). 
 324. See U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 1 (granting judicial authority over claims 
between a U.S. state or citizen and a foreign state).  
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considerations to a foreign state.325 However, both the Executive 
and Legislative Branches expressly stated concerns about 
over-extending foreign sovereign immunity.326 The State 
Department issued the Tate Letter in response to concerns over 
inconsistent application of immunity over foreign states.327 The 
Department recognized an inherent unfairness in allowing all 
foreign state action to evade adjudication in U.S. courts.328 The 
Tate Letter’s advocacy for the restrictive theory of sovereign 
immunity was a key contributing factor in Congress adopting the 
FSIA.329 The FSIA maintained a presumption of immunity for the 
majority of foreign state action; however, when Congress weighed 
the benefits of foreign immunity against potential injuries to U.S. 
citizens, there were circumstances where it found immunity 
unjustified.330 These exceptions, including the commercial 
activities exception, indicate Congress’s intent to promote the 
interests of U.S. citizens over the goals of sovereign immunity in 
these limited contexts.331 Because the political branches expressed 
the appropriate application of foreign sovereign immunity, it is 
unnecessary for the Court to extend constitutional provisions to a 
foreign state.  
Disqualifying a foreign state as a “person” under the Due 
Process Clause eliminates the need for a minimum contacts 
analysis to assert personal jurisdiction under the direct effect 
clause. Instead, a plain reading of the statute resolves the question 
of personal jurisdiction. The FSIA succinctly states requirements 
                                                                                                     
 325. See Damrosch, supra note 123, at 496 (noting that benefits include 
promoting constitutional principles in the global context and fostering good 
relations with foreign states).  
 326. See supra Part III.B–C (outlining the Executive Branch’s concerns over 
absolute sovereign immunity and Congress’s response by adopting the FSIA).  
 327. See supra notes 152–154 (discussing the State Department’s unilateral 
action to adopt restrictive application of immunity to reduce unfairness). 
 328. See Tate Letter, supra note 152 (arguing that increased foreign 
government commercial activity required U.S. courts to determine parties’ rights 
and obligations).  
 329. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 161, at 8 (highlighting that the 
State Department faced the awkward position of interjecting into immunity 
litigation already before the courts).  
 330. See supra Part III.C (detailing the structure of the FSIA and its 
exceptions).  
 331. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (noting that providing 
plaintiffs with a judicial remedy was one of four major goals of the FSIA).  
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for both subject matter and personal jurisdiction. First, federal 
district courts have subject matter jurisdiction over any claim for 
relief arising under one of the FSIA exceptions.332 Once subject 
matter jurisdiction is established, personal jurisdiction exists so 
long as the foreign state is properly served according to the 
requirements in 28 U.S.C. § 1608.333 Personal jurisdiction over a 
foreign state is limited by requiring an initial finding of subject 
matter jurisdiction under one of the enumerated FSIA 
exceptions.334 Foreign states have an additional procedural 
safeguard in that an appearance does not confer personal 
jurisdiction for purposes of the FSIA exceptions.335  
The Sixth Circuit’s decision properly dismissed the foreign 
defendant’s assertion the FSIA’s legislative history entitled it to 
personal jurisdiction only if it complied with the Due Process 
Clause.336 In rejecting this argument, the Sixth Circuit 
appropriately denied reading in additional statutory 
requirements.337 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Corzo incorrectly 
considers the legislative history of the FSIA instead of adopting 
the unambiguous statutory requirements. Because the language in 
the FSIA is clear and sufficient to give courts proper subject matter 
and personal jurisdiction, it is unnecessary to draw inferences 
about personal jurisdiction from the legislative history.   
                                                                                                     
 332. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (2012) (“The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction . . . to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the 
foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under sections 1605-1607 of this 
title or under any applicable international agreement.”). 
 333. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (2012) (granting personal jurisdiction so long as 
service is made in accordance with section 1608). Section 1608 outlines four ways 
to serve a foreign state, including service on an authorized agent or use of an 
international convention on service of documents. 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (2018).  
 334. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (conditioning a finding of personal jurisdiction on 
an initial finding of subject matter jurisdiction). 
 335. See id. (denying personal jurisdiction over a foreign state by appearance 
outside of the context of the FSIA claim). 
 336. See Rote, 816 F.3d at 392–93 (determining that the defendant’s reading 
was inappropriate because the statute was unambiguous).  
 337. See id. at 393 (refusing to insert additional requirements where it would 
not resolve any ambiguity).  
IF THE SHOE FITS 171 
B. Applying a Minimum Contacts Analysis is Contrary to the 
Structure and Purpose of the Direct Effect Clause 
The FSIA provides blanket immunity for foreign states in U.S. 
courts. Congress included a number of exceptions to this 
immunity. 28 U.S.C § 1605 of the FSIA, which provides six general 
exceptions to immunity, reflects the important shift from an 
absolute to a restrictive theory of foreign immunity.338 These 
exceptions capture circumstances where Congress determined that 
protecting the interests of U.S. citizens outweighed the 
long-standing principle of foreign sovereign immunity.339 The 
exceptions are narrow and a claim against a foreign state only 
moves forward when expressly authorized by the statute.340  
Requiring minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction creates 
a burden for U.S. plaintiffs not contemplated by Congress. The 
commercial activities exception demonstrates Congress’s 
recognition that the commercial acts of foreign states have the 
potential to damage U.S. citizens.341 The exception intended to 
provide relief for plaintiffs who had no judicial recourse against a 
foreign government who caused harm after entering into private 
commerce.342  
A review of the structure of the commercial activities 
exception, as well as other FSIA exceptions, demonstrates that 
Congress intended a less restrictive jurisdictional requirement for 
the direct effect clause.343 The first clause of the commercial 
activities exception dictates a territorial connection—specifically, 
that the act must have taken place in part or in whole within 
                                                                                                     
 338. See supra Part III.B (discussing how increased interaction between U.S. 
citizens and foreign states rendered the theory of absolute immunity 
unworkable). 
 339. See supra note 176 (stating that foreign commercial activity was 
Congress’s most pressing concern).  
 340. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983) 
(“[S]ubject matter jurisdiction in any such action depends on the existence of one 
of the specified exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.”). 
 341. See supra Part III.D (detailing Congress’s motivation for adopting the 
commercial activities exception).  
 342. See supra notes 176–180 (noting that Congress’s primary concern when 
drafting the exceptions was foreign states’ commercial activity).   
 343. See supra notes 182–187 (detailing the jurisdictional differences in the 
three clauses of the commercial activities exception). 
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United States territory.344 The second clause covers conduct in the 
United States that relates to commercial conduct abroad.345 Unlike 
the first two clauses, the direct effect clause does not dictate a strict 
territorial requirement and provides for jurisdiction over 
commercial acts with less significant contact.346 It follows that the 
direct effect clause does not require minimum contacts, rather it 
requires what is clearly written in the statute: that an act cause a 
direct effect in the United States. Congress was aware of the 
significance of asserting jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign, and 
included additional jurisdictional requirements where it deemed it 
necessary.347 For example, the FSIA noncommercial tort exception 
specifically requires that the conduct occurs within United States 
territory—subject matter jurisdiction under this exception 
explicitly excludes extraterritorial conduct.348 However, when 
Congress drafted the direct effect clause of the commercial 
activities exception, it chose to require only subject matter 
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction through proper service.349 
Though the reference to the Restatement (Second) of Foreign 
Relations in the legislative history mentions requirements of 
substantiality and foreseeability,350 Congress chose not to include 
those elements in the statute. These examples demonstrate that 
Congress used its discretion to impose a lesser jurisdictional nexus 
than minimum contacts under the direct effect clause. 
                                                                                                     
 344. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 161, at 17 (“It will be for the courts 
to determine whether a particular commercial activity has been performed in 
whole or in part in the United States. This definition, however, is intended to 
reflect a degree of contact beyond that occasioned simply by U.S. citizenship or 
U.S. residence of the plaintiff.”). 
 345. See id. at 19 (noting that although some of this activity overlaps with the 
first clause, it is advisable to expressly provide for the case where a claim relates 
to a commercial activity abroad). 
 346. See supra note 186 (describing the direct effect clause as requiring the 
lowest threshold of contact with the United States for jurisdiction).  
 347. See supra note 196 (providing that the noncommercial tort exception 
permits jurisdiction only for conduct within U.S. territory).  
 348. See supra notes 193–194 and accompanying text (noting the stricter 
jurisdiction requirements for the noncommercial tort exception).  
 349. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text (describing the statutory 
jurisdiction requirements for the commercial activities exception). 
 350. See supra notes 190–192 (discussing the Restatement’s purpose of 
requiring the connection to the U.S. before allowing jurisdiction). 
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The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Rote appropriately interprets 
what constitutes a direct effect by adhering to the plain text of the 
clause.351 The Supreme Court determined in Weltover that an 
effect is direct where “it follows as an immediate consequence of 
the defendant’s activity.”352 Adopting the same reasoning, the Rote 
court found the language of the statute unambiguous, therefore 
reading in additional jurisdiction requirements was 
unnecessary.353 Contrarily, the Ninth Circuit decided Corzo 
according to precedent set before the Supreme Court gave its 
guidance in Weltover on the proper interpretation of the direct 
effect clause.354 The Ninth Circuit’s view rests on an outdated 
interpretation of the direct effect clause made at a time where the 
clause caused great confusion and the circuit courts struggled to 
come to a uniform conclusion.355 The Corzo court’s holding did not 
take into consideration the more recent guidance provided by 
Weltover on properly interpreting the direct effect clause.356 
Although the Supreme Court in Weltover did not make an express 
finding on the minimum contacts standard, it did provide guidance 
on the appropriate method of interpretation of the direct effect 
clause.357 Therefore, the Court should definitively resolve the issue 
by following the Rote court’s plain language interpretation to hold 
that establishing minimum contacts is not a necessary 
requirement for personal jurisdiction under the direct effect 
clause. 
                                                                                                     
 351. See Rote v. Zel Custom Mfg. LLC, 816 F.3d 383, 392 (2016) (finding that 
the operative words in the statute were unambiguous).  
 352. Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992).  
 353. See supra note 307 (explaining that the Rote court made its 
determination in accordance with the Supreme Court’s guidance).  
 354. See Corzo v. Banco Cent. de Reserva del Peru, 243 F.3d 519, 525–26 
(2001) (affirming the court’s own precedent that the direct effect clause required 
minimum contacts).  
 355. See supra Part IV.A (discussing inconsistencies in the initial 
interpretations of the direct effect clause).  
 356. See supra notes 308–09 (arguing that the Ninth Circuit disregarded the 
Supreme Court’s guidance not to read unexpressed requirements into the 
statute). 
 357. See supra notes 249–52 (stating that the clause is properly interpreted 
using a plain reading of the statute).  
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VI. Conclusion 
The direct effect clause of the FSIA’s commercial activities 
exception provides the only opportunity to hold foreign states 
accountable for those commercial acts occurring outside of U.S. 
territory. Providing foreign states with constitutional protections, 
or reading additional jurisdictional requirements into the 
language of the direct effect clause, precludes U.S. plaintiffs from 
the only path to a remedy for injuries caused by the foreign state. 
For these reasons, the Sixth Circuit’s plain language 
interpretation of the direct effect clause of the commercial 
activities exception properly denies due process protection to 
foreign states while carrying out the purpose of the FSIA.  
 
